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REJECTION OF THE FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE IN AUSTRALIA: 
A RETREAT FROM PROGRESSMSM 
KENNETH J ARENSON* 
Abstract 
This article canvasses the key Australian exclusionary rules 
and discretions to exclude evidence under both the common 
law and its statutory counterparts in the Uniform Evidence 
Legislation now in effect in the Commonwealth, Victoria, 
New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and 
Tasmania. In examining these exclusionary rules and 
discretions, an analysis is made as to whether evidence 
derived from primary evidence excluded under one or 
more of these rules should also be excluded under an 
American style 'fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine' - and 
why or why not. Finally, the article compares the current 
Australian approach to this doctrine with the present state 
of the American doctrine and the recognised exceptions 
thereto. The article concludes with recommendations 
for applying the doctrine in both countries, subject to 
suggested changes in the law that take the realities of 
political correctness and human frailty into account. 
I INTRODUCTION 
As a matter of Australian common law doctrine, there a number of rules 
and discretions that reqUire or permit magistrates and judges to exclude 
both confessional as well as real evidence, the latter referring to tangible 
evidence such as a murder weapon, the body of a deceased person, DNA 
samples and the like. l The discussion to follow will not only examine 
the purpose and scope of these rules and discretions, but also contrast 
them With Similar rules contained in the Bill of Rights of the American 
Constitution which are designed to serve similar purposes, the most 
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paramount of which is to act as a deterrent against police misconduct. In 
so doing, special attention will focus on one particular doctrine that was 
designed to further the objective of deterrence; namely, the American 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine.2 Under this doctrine, evidence 
obtained in direct violation of the Fourth,3 Fifth4 and Sixth5 Amendments 
to the United States Constitution (primary evidence), as made applicable 
to the States via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Arnendment;6 
is inadmissible, as is any other evidence that would not have been 
discovered but-for the unconstitutional procurement of the primary 
evidence (derivative evidence).7 The underpinning of this doctrine is 
both logical and readily apparent: to deter those whose responsibility it 
is to enforce the law from violating the same as a means to that end. 
As will be discussed below, the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine 
has been severely emasculated in America and rejected altogether 
in Australia.8 Yet if the paramount purpose of the aforementioned 
2 Nardone v United States, 308 US 338 (1939); Silverborne Lumber Co v United 
States, 251 US 385, 192 (1920) (Holmes D. For a thorough analysis of the scope and 
purpose of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, see ibid 73-110. 
3 United States Constitution amend IV. This amendment protects people from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures conducted by state and federal law enforcement of-
ficials. 
4 United States Constitution amend V. This amendment confers many important rights. 
For present purposes, the most important is (he right against self-incrimination and 
the exclusionary rule relating thereto. 
5 United States Constitution amend VI. This amendment also confers many important 
rights in criminal prosecutions. In the context of this paper, the relevant right is the 
right to the Assistance of Counsel and its attendant exclusionary rule. 
6 United States Constitution amend XIV. For an explanation of the 'incorporation' doc-
trine through which these rights are made applicable to the states via the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see below n 114. 
7 See above n 2. As the readers will discover below, the but-for test is a necessary, but 
not always sufficient basis upon which to exclude both primary as well as derivative 
evidence obtained by unconstitutional means. In the past few decades, the American 
courts have recognised at least four exceptions that allow such evidence to be admit· 
ted in spite of the unconstitutional means by which it was discovered. 
8 This is a fact that is so widely known and accepted within the Australian legal pro-
fession, law enforcement agencies and law-related disciplines that a court would be 
justified in taking jUdicial notice of this fact were it not for the fact that this is far 
from common knowledge to those who lack training in criminal law matters. This 
may well explain the lack of or paucity of Australian cases which expressly refer to 
Australia's rejection of the doctrine. Thus, the author was unable to locate a primary 
source that unequivocally supports the proposition that Australia has rejected the 
American exclusionary rule and the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine that serves 
as an integral component of the rule. In Mellifont's treatise, she devotes her entire dig.. 
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exclusionary rules and discretions is that of deterrence, how does one 
explain this emasculation and rejection? If, for example, the police beat a 
confession out of a person who is arrested on suspicion of murder and the 
confession (primary evidence) is later ruled inadmissible on the ground 
that it was obtained involuntarily, should the prosecution be permitted 
to adduce evidence of the deceased's body (derivative evidence) which 
was discovered solely as a result of the inadmissible confession? If so, 
does this frustrate or further the paramount interest in deterring police 
misconduct? The obvious answer is the former because the police have 
gained a forensic advantage as a direct result of their misconduct. 
This piece will demonstrate that contrary to the oft-quoted statement by 
Chief Justice John Marshall that the government of the United States (and 
presumably Australia) is one 'of laws and not of men',9 the reality is that 
the degree to which these exclusionary rules and discretions are enforced 
is inordinately impacted by the perceived seriousness of the offence at 
issue rather than a strict application of the relevant exclusionary rule 
or discretion; that is to say that irrespective of how blatant, serious or 
deliberate the police misconduct may be or the extent to which a failure 
to enforce these rules and discretions will encourage more of the same 
and involve the courts in curial approval of the police misconduct, the 
courts have displayed an unmistakable penchant for subordinating these 
source. In all Australian jurisdictions there are statutes requiring all confessional evi-
dence to be tape and/or video recorded as a prerequisite to admissibility: Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) s 23V (also applicable in the ACT); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464H; Crimi-
nal Procedure Act 1958 (NSW) s 281(2); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 
2000 (Qld) s 436; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74D, 74E; Police Administra-
tion Act (NT) S8 142, 143; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (\VA) s 118(3); Evidence 
Act 2001 (Tas) s 85A. These are commonly referred to as anti-verballing statutes, the 
purpose of which is to prevent the police from giving false evidence to the effect that 
an accused made an admission or confession. These statutes confer discretion on the 
courts to admit unrecorded confessional evidence under special circumstances such 
as, for example, where exceptional circumstances justify admission or it would not 
be contrary to the interests of justice to do so: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464(H) (3); 
Crimes Act 1914 (eth) s 23V. The discretion conferred by these provisions is not 
discussed in this article because: (a) its focus is limited to the various common law 
and statutory rules and discretions to exclude incriminating evidence and Australia's 
rejection of the American exclusionary rule that renders evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States inadmissible; and (b) the underpinning of the discretion to admit evidence 
despite non-compliance with Australia's anti-verballing statutes appears to be that cor-
roborating evidence may exist which, by its very existence, confirms that the putative 
confessional evidence was in fact given by the accused. If the cOlTOborating evidence 
consists of derivative evidence flowing from the outative orimarv ronf",cc;nn ............. 
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rules to the competing societal interest in bringing the gUilty to justice. lo 
Thus, empirical evidence demonstrates that the judiciaries in Australia, 
the United States and probably other western governments, ate so result-
driven and consumed with political correctness that the aforementioned 
rules and discretions are accorded little more than lip service in instances 
where serious crimes are involved. 11 
Before proceeding to Part II, the readers should be aware that in South 
Australia, Queensland,WesternAustralia and the Northern Territory, these 
exclusionary rules and discretions are governed by theAustralian common 
law doctrine; in the remaining jurisdictions of the Commonwealth, 
New South Wales, Victoria) Norfolk Island, the ACT and Tasmania, they 
are largely governed by the Uniform EVidence Legislation (hereafter 
referred to as 'the UEL').While the DEL codifies the common law in some 
instances and substantially mirrors it in others, it will be seen that there is 
one exclusionary rule in regard to which the DEL is conspicuously silent. 
This ambiguity is dealt with in s 9 of the VEL which provides: 
(1) This Act does not affect the operation of a prinCiple or rule of common 
law or eqUity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which this Act 
applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by 
necessary intendment. 
Note:This section differs from section 9 of the CommonwealrhAct.That 
section preserves the written and unwritten laws of States and Territories 
in relation to various matters. 
The relevance of s 9 to that exclusionary rule and various statutory 
discretions under the DEL will be addressed below (in Part lIB). 
II CONFESSIONAL EVIDENCE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF 
VOLUNTARlNESS 
In the context of this discussion and in legal parlance generally, the term 
'confessional evidence' denotes both full confessions as well as what is 
10 See B Presser, 'Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-evaluation of the Judicial Discretion 
to Exclude Improperly or Illegally Obtained Evidence' (2001) 25 Melbourne Univer-
sity Law Review 757, 780-781. 
II Research conducted for this paper indicates that in murder cases, evidence was ex· 
cluded in 4.5 of the 61 cases examined, or 7.37% (under [hese exclusionary rules 
and discretions); in anned robbery and robbery offences, the evidence was partially 
excluded in only one case out of 17, or 2.94%. On the other hand, in less serious 
offences such as driving offences, animal cruelty, drug possession and disorderly con-
• ~ - ... ,- 1/' Aut n.f '1."7 r:lses. or 37.84%. Thus, the exclusion 
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referred to as admissions against interest. A confession is a statement 
or series of statements made, adopted by or otherwise imputed to an 
accused which, if accepted as truthful, would be sufficient to support 
a conviction for the offence or offences to which it relates. 12 Thus, an 
example of a confession would be a description given by an accused as 
to how and when he or she intentionally caused the death of another 
human being without lawful excuse or mitigating factors that might 
serve to reduce what would otherwise constitute murder to the lesser 
crime of voluntary manslaughter or some analogous offence, depending 
on the particular jurisdiction in which the crime was committed. 13 An 
admission against interest, on the other hand, is a statement or series 
of statements made, adopted by or otherwise imputed to an accused 
which, if accepted as true, would constitute circumstantial evidence of 
an accused's guilt) albeit insufficient by itself to support a conviction for 
the relevant offence or offences.14 An example of an admission against 
interest would be a statement by an accused that put him or her at the 
time and place of the offence in question. Subject to one exception 
noted below,15 the distinction between a confession and an admission 
against interest is unimportant, as both are subject to the exact same 
exclusionary rules and discretions. 16 
Where confessional evidence is concerned, the common law position is 
that such evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution can prove, on 
the balance of probabilities, that it was obtained voluntarily. 17 Moreover, 
there are two available limbs upon which an accused can predicate an 
argument that confessional evidence was obtained involuntarily, thereby 
triggering the common law rule of exclusion .18 The ftrst limb involves any 
scenario in which the confessional evidence was given as a consequence 
of overbearing the will of the accused; this would include instances 
in which the evidence was obtained as a result of duress, persistent 
12K] Arenson, M Bagaric and L Neal, Criminal Processes and Investigative Procedures: 
Victoria and Commonwealtb (LexisNexis, 2009) 171-2. 
13 See, for example, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 6, 318(2)(b)-(d) Infanticide and Culpable 
Driving Causing Death respectively. 
14 See above n 12. 
15 See below n 22. 
16 See also Evidence Act 1958 (Vic), s 149 which was recently repealed. Prior to its re-
peal, s 149 governed the admissibility of full confeSsions that were allegedly obtained 
involuntarily due to inducements offered by persons in positions of authority that were 
not removed prior to the making of the confession. Under this statutory provision, con-
fessions were not to be excluded on this basis unless the court was satisfied that the 
inducement was such that under the circumstances, it was likely to produce an untrue 
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questioning, sustained pressure, threats, intimidation and the like.19 In 
adjudging whether the accused's will was overborne due to one or more 
of these factors, a subjective test is applied which takes into account the 
totality of circumstances such as the age, intellect and background of the 
accused, as well as the methods employed by the police in procuring 
the confessional evidence. 2o It is noteworthy that voluntariness or a lack 
thereof in this context does not necessarily require illegal or improper 
conduct on the part of law enforcement; rather, the focus is on the effect 
of the law enforcement personnel's conduct on the will of the accused. 21 
The second limb under which confessional evidence will be excluded 
as having been obtained involuntarily is when the evidence in question 
was preceded by an inducement offered by a person in a position of 
authority that was not removed prior to the making of the confession or 
admission in question. 22 An inducement is an express or implied promise 
of favourable or unfavourable treatment that is directed at the accused 
or another or others.23 A person in a position of authority includes 
'officers of police and the like, the prosecutor, and others concerned in 
preferring the charge' .24 Although the inducement need not be the sole 
or but-for cause of the making of the confession or admission, it must be 
shown to have been a significant factor in inducing the accused to make 
the confessional statement(s).2S Finally, whether an express or implied 
inducement has been made is to be determined by an objective standard 
that is based on whether a reasonable bystander would have regarded 
the police conduct as an inducement. 26 
19 McDermott v The Queen (1948) 76 CLR 501, 511-512 (Dixon J). 
20 Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257, 307. 
21 Ibid (Brennan J). 
22 McDermott v The Queen (1948) 76 CLR 1, 511 (Dixon J). In Queensland, there is 
a statutory rule that operates in addition to this second limb of the common law 
voluntariness rule: Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 (Qld) s 10. This provision 
provides that '[n]o confession which is tendered in evidence on any criminal pro-
ceeding shall be received which has been induced by any threat or promise by some 
person in authority, and every confession made after any such threat or promise shall 
be deemed to have been induced thereby unless the contrary be shown. The second 
limb of common law rule is broader in its application than s 10 in that it applies to 
all confessional evidence rather than merely confessions. On the other hand, s lOis 
stricter than the common law in that it contains a rebuttable presumption of sorts that 
all confessions made following inducements offered by persons in authority were in 
fact induced thereby. 
23 R v Thompson [1893) 2 QB 12, 17 (Cave D; Cornelius v The Queen (1936) 55 eLR 
- -.. ..._. ~ -.;0----. ... _A M~Tiprn~., Tn: R v Bertrand [2008] VSCA 182 (19 
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What is the underlying rationale for the requirement that confessional 
evidence be obtained voluntarily? The answer, according to Australian 
authority,27 is two-fold: (1) that confessional evidence obtained involuntarily 
is often likely to be unreliable and, therefore, it often lacks probative 
value;28 and (2) that excluding involuntarily obtained evidence is 
necessary in order to safeguard the common law right to remain silent29 
which, in the absence of some form of legal compulsion to speak, allows 
one to remain silent in response to questions or comments from persons 
in positions of authority without fear of having any adverse inference of 
consciousness of gUilt drawn from such silence.3o This brings us to the 
question of whether Australia's rejection of the 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine' is consonant with these stated underpinnings. 
A Voluntariness and the Fruit o/the Poisonous Tree Doctrine: 
Confessional and Real Evidence 
If the derivative evidence is such as to confirm the reliability of the 
primary confession or admission, the reliability rationale clearly militates 
against application of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine in order 
to exclude the former. If, on the other hand, the derivative evidence 
undermines the reliability of the primary evidence or fails to support it, 
rejection of the doctrine appears to be unwarranted, especially when the 
reliability rationale is balanced against the competing public interest in 
deterring police misconduct.31 If the rationale is rights protection, in this 
case safeguarding the common law right to remain silent, then whether 
a cogent argument for rejection of the doctrine exists will depend on 
the nature of the derivative evidence. If the derivative evidence consists 
of real evidence, rejection also seems appropriate because the right of 
silence does not protect against disclosure of that genre of evidence. 
If, however, the derivative evidence consists of confessional evidence 
27 R v SwafJield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 167 (Brennan C]), 
28 Ibid, citing Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1,18] (Deane]). 
29 Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95. See also G Davies, 'Exclusion of Evidence 
IUegally or Improperly Obtained' (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 170, 177, 
30 KJ Arenson and M Bagaric, Rules of Evidence in Australia: Text & Cases (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2007) 48-9, Mellifont, above n 1, 116-17, speaks of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination rather than the common law right of silence, In so 
doing, she offers no authority other than the judgment of Brennan J in R v Swaffield 
(1998) 192 CLR 159, 169 (citing the judgment of Deane J in Cleland v The Queen 
(1982) 151 CLR 1,18). Brennan]'s judgment, however, went on to speak ofthe 'right 
to silence' as the one identified by the trial judge as having been violated by the police 
misconduct in question, As it is indeed very rare that an accused in custody is under 
any form of legal compulsion to speak, it is clear that the legal compUlsion necessary 
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which is protected by the right, the result should depend on whether: (a) 
the factors rendering the primary confessional evidence involuntary and 
inadmissible are still operating at the time of the derivative confession 
or admission; and/or (b) whether the fact of the primary confession 
caused the accused to believe that having already given the primary 
confessional evidence, he or she had nothing more to lose by repeating 
the incriminating statement(s).32 
In addition, rights protection necessarily includes deterrence,for how can 
any right be of value if there are no effective sanctions to deter the police 
from violating it? If that is so, then any evidence, confessional or real, must 
be excluded if it was discovered as the result of an involuntarily obtained 
confession. 33 Even if one rejects the notion that rights protection cannot 
exist without an effective deterrent, the public interest in deterring 
the police from violating the law as a means of enforcing the same34 
is so universally accepted that any argument in favour of rejecting the 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine) irrespective of the circumstances, 
must be balanced against it. 35 To be sure, it stretches credulity to 
believe that deterring police misconduct is not a major underpinning 
of any exclusionary rule or discretion that is predicated upon illegal 
or improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials. While 
it is indisputable that application of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine in any given circumstance involves a balancing of competing 
public policy considerations, the writer's view is that the predominant 
32 Mellifont, above n 1, 118-19. Although Mellifont cites no Australian authority in sup· 
port of this pOSition, she does cite English authority in support of requirement (a) 
and a dissenting judgment of a United States Supreme Court justice in support of 
requirement (b): R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, 41; Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985) 
(Brennan J, dissenting). 
33 In so far as the causal nexus that must exist between the primary confessional evidence 
and the derivative eVidence in question, the common law position is unclear. It 
appears, however, that the latter must have been obtained or discovered as a result of 
the police misconduct that led to the exclusion of the former. What remains unclear is 
whether the miscondm;:t must be a sole, dominant or, at a minimum, significant factor 
leading to [he discovery of the latter; the same appears to apply when Lee or Bunning 
discretion is used to e:xclude primary evidence which leads to the discovery of other 
incriminating derivative evidence: Mellifont, above n 1, 147-48. Under S8 138 and 139 
of the UEL, the statutory analogues to the common law Bunning discretion, a but-for 
causal nexus must be established between the police illegality or impropriety and 
any primary or derivative evidence sought to be excluded: Employment Advocate v 
Williamson (2001) III FCR 20, 44; DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399, 420. As will 
be seen below, s 138 expressly provides for circumstances under which such fruits 
must likewise be excluded: UEL, ss 138(1) and (2). 
. "., 
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consideration must always be that of deterring police misconduct and 
avoiding the appearance of curial approval of the same by the courts. 
Indeed, if the laws are construed in such a manner as to allow the police 
to derive even the slightest advantage from their misconduct, the result 
will be none other than to encourage more of the same and bring the 
courts into disrepute by involving them in curial approval of the official 
misconduct. To permit the police to benefit by their misconduct is to 
make our society a fascist one of men and not laws rather than one of 
'laws and not of men'.36 As will be discussed in greater detail below, 
however, the objective of deterrence is not generally served by imposing 
sanctions, whether via the exclusion of evidence or otherwise, on those 
who act with a genuine belief that their conduct is entirely legal and 
proper. Thus, any exclusion of evidence based on a deterrence rationale 
must be predicated upon a showing of not only official misconduct, but 
an awareness or reckless disregard of the misconduct on the part of the 
responsible officia1es). 
B Voluntartness and Section 84 oj the UBL 
As noted previously, several Australian jurisdictions have enacted the UEL 
which substantially codifies the conunon law in so far as the exclusionary 
rules and discretions are concerned. For example, s 84 of the UEL codifies 
the first limb of the rule excluding confessional evidence that is obtained 
involuntarily.37 Section 84 provides: 
36 Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). 
37 For a contrary view as to whether s 84 of the UEL codifies the common law test of 
voluntariness for the admissibility of confessional evidence, see Mellifont, above n 
1, 126-28; Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, Report No 
102 (2006) pO.7}; S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Lawbook, 7th ed, 2006) 331. 
Odgers argues that the expression 'influenced by' implies only a minimal causal nexus 
between the conduct enumerated in s 84 and the 'admission, and the making of the 
admission'. Thus, Odgers concludes that exclusion of confeSSional evidence will be 
easier to achieve under s 84 than at common law because s 84 requires, as a prereq-
uisite to admission, that the prosecution prove on the balance of probabilities that 
the enumerated factors had no affect whatever on the making of the confession or 
admission. The problem with this argument is that the common law required that the 
confession or admission be excluded if, based on the totality of circumstances, they 
were the result of an overbearing of the will of the accused. The common law is un-
clear as to whether the impugned conduct has to be the sole or even the predominant 
factor giving rise to the making of the confession or admission. Thus, it could just as 
easily be argued that as in the case of 5 84, so too does the common law require the 
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Section 84 Exclusion of admissions influenced by violence and certain other 
conduct 
(1) Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that 
the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by-
(a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether 
towards the person who made the admission Or towards another 
person; or 
(b) a threat of conduct of that kind. 
(2) Subsection (1) only applies if the party against whom evidence of the 
admission is adduced has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether 
the admission or its making were so influenced. 
Although s 84 is silent on various other aspects of the common law rule 
that was set out above, s 9 of the UEL operates to fill in these missing 
details such as, for example, the requirement that the decision as to 
whether to exclude must be based on the totality of circumstances.38 
Although conspicuously absent in S 84 is any reference to the word 
'inducement', there is no doubt that the inclusion of the words <threat of 
conduct of that kind' in sub-s 84(1)(b) qualifies as an inducement of the 
type that would result in the exclusion of confessional evidence under the 
second limb of the common law rule, assuming that it was held out by a 
person in a position of authority, that the threat was not removed prior 
to the making of the confession or admission, and that the threat was at 
least a significant factor in inducing the confession or admission to be 
made. That aside, the fact that s 84 represents a clear codification of the 
first limb of the voluntariness rule raises a question as to why sub-s 84(1) 
(b) refers to what is certainly an inducement for purposes of the second 
limb of the rule. It appears that this sub-section was included in order to 
emphasise that inducements, while covered lll1der the second limb, can 
nonetheless be a factor to consider in determining whether the confession 
or admission was influenced by the factors set forth in s 84. Though there 
is a conspicuous paucity of authority on this question, this seems to be 
consistent with the position at common law. 'While there is no reason 
that an inducement should not be a factor, among others, in determining 
whether a confession or admission resulted from offiCial conduct through 
which the accused's will was overborne, it cannot be the sole or primary 
factor under the frrst limb of the common law rule. If it were othetwise 
then the second limb, which deals exclusively with confessional evidence 
obtained by way of inducements, would be superfluous. 
In regard to the second limb of the common law rule, it is noteworthy 
that this limb is neither codified nor addressed in any manner by the 
T rm In f~rt th~ word 'inducement' is virtually absent from the various 
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85(3)(a)(ii) which deals with a discretion to exclude confessional 
evidence for reasons having to do with official conduct that may have 
caused such evidence to be unreliable. Thus, by virtue of s 9 of the VEL, 
the second limb of the common law rule appears to be fully intact; 
there is precious little evidence that the drafters of the UEL intended to 
displace the second limb of the common law rule, either expressly or by 
necessary implication. 
It is noteworthy that s 84(2) reposes a burden on the accused to raise 
the issue of voluntariness. Although s 84(1) does not expressly place 
the legal burden on the prosecution to demonstrate on the balance of 
probabilities that the confessional evidence and its making were not 
influenced by the factors enumerated in s 84(l)(a)-(b), the common 
law pOSition is that the prosecution bears this legal burden whenever 
evidence arises that casts doubt on the rebuttable presumption that all 
confessional evidence is obtained voluntarily.39 By virtue of the operation 
of s 9 of the UEL, therefore, s 84 must be construed as consonant with the 
common law pOSition. Further, if evidence arises that calls into question 
the voluntariness of confeSSional evidence, the common law requires 
the court to conduct a voir dire on this issue-irrespective of whether 
the accused requests it or, for that matter, brings the issue to the court's 
attention.4o In this instance, it is clear that Parliament intended for s 84(2) 
to displace the common law rule. 
III CONFESSIONAL EVIDENCE AND THE LEE OR FAIRNESS 
DISCRETION 
Even if confessional evidence is found to have been obtained voluntarily, 
there are various common law discretions under which it can still be 
excluded;41 namely, the Lee42 (fairness) discretion, the Bunning,43 (public 
policy discretion) and the Christie44 discretion to exclude evidence 
tendered by the prosecution whenever its probative value is outweighed 
by its tendency to unfairly prejudice the accused's common law right to 
a fair trial. In this segment we examine the scope and underpinnings of 
the Lee/fairness discretion and, in particular, the extent, if any, to which 
the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine applies to derivative evidence 
discovered as a consequence of any primary evidence that is excluded 
under this doctrine. The Bunning (public policy) discretion will be 
discussed in Part Iv. 
39 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 eLR 512. 
40 Ibid. 
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This discretion was first recognised in McDermott v The King,45 although 
it is commonly referred to as the Lee discretion because it became finnly 
implanted in Australian jurisprudence in the case of R v Lee.46 Under 
the Lee discretion, which applies only to confessional evidence,47 the 
court must exclude this type of evidence if, taking into account the 
circumstances under which it was made, it would be unfair to admit it 
against the accused.48 In this context, the word 'circumstances' denotes 
some form of improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials, 
though improper conduct does not necessarily require that the conduct 
be illegal.49 For example, a failure to comply with standing orders 
promulgated by the Commissioner of Police would constitute improper, 
but not illegal conduct, because standing orders do not carry the force of 
law. In R v Lee, the High Court further explained that for purposes of this 
discretion, the word 'unfair' is concerned with the effect of the improper 
conduct on the accused in so far as the extent to which it seriously calls 
into question the reliability of the confessional evidence at issue.5o The 
Court went on to hold that this type of unfairness, while not the sole basis 
for the exercise of the Lee discretion, is nonetheless its touchstone.51 For 
example, if the police falsely indicate to a mentally handicapped suspect 
that his or her DNA was found on a murder weapon and/or that they 
have several eyewitnesses who identified the suspect as the perpetrator, 
a court would be more than justified in finding that the effect of the 
police deception on the suspect was such as to create a serious risk that 
any subsequent confession made by him or her was unreliable, assuming 
there was no other cogent eVidence to implicate the suspect in the 
commission of the offence in question.52This would be true regardless of 
whether the police deception was technically illegal or merely regarded 
as improper conduct under a standing order or otherwise. 
Consonant with the above discussion of Lee discretion, cases decided 
subsequent to R v Lee have purported to expand the notion of when 
45 (1948) 76 CLR 501. 
46 (1950) 82 CLR 133. 
47 R v Lee, (1950) 82 CLR 133, 159; Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR I, 6 (Gibbs C] 
with whom Murphy, Wilson, Deane and Dawson]] concurred). 
48 R v lee (950) 82 CLR 133. 
49 Ibid 144-145. 
50 Ibid 152-153, 154. 
51 Ibid 159; see also R v Swaffteld (998) 192 CLR 159, 189 (roo hey, Gaudron and Gum-
mow)}). 
52 What if there is police misconduct that, but·for corroborating evidence (derivative 
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it would be 'unfair' to admit the evidence against the accused. 53 In 
R v Swaffield54 three High Court justices, citing Van der Meer v The 
Queen and Duke v The Queen, stated per obiter dicta that unfairness 
might also include instances in which but-for the police misconduct, 
the confessional evidence would not have been made at all.55 Finally, 
and again per obiter dicta, some justices opined that unfairness might 
envisage scenarios in which the evidence resulting from the illegal or 
improper police conduct would, if admitted, place the accused at a 
forensic disadvantage at his or her triaL 56 
In Foster v The Queen,57 for example, two young suspects were detained 
and questioned concerning their putative involvement in setting fire to 
a building. Prior to and during questioning, the police violated several of 
the Police Commissioner's standing orders, one of which included their 
refusal to allow the mother of one of the suspects to be present during 
questioning. When the suspect-son later disputed that he had made an 
unrecorded confession as the police claimed, the fact that the mother 
had been excluded from the interrogation effectively denied the accused 
any opportunity to corroborate his version of events, thereby placing him 
at a forensic disadvantage at the subsequent trial. Despite the fact that 
both the but-for and forensic disadvantage elements of unfairness were 
noted by various justices, their status must be described as somewhat 
tenuous when one considers that a majority of the High Court has yet to 
unequivocally state that they are part and parcel of the test of unfairness 
for purposes of the Lee discretion. 
A Lee/Unfairness Discretion and the Fruit of the 
Poisonous Tree Doctrine 
As noted above, avoiding the real risk of admitting unreliable confessional 
evidence is a major underpinning of the Lee discretion. As also noted 
previously, there is some support among High Court justices for the but-
for and forensic disadvantage notions of what constitutes the type of 
circumstances that would make it unfair to admit confessional evidence 
against an accused. In R v Swaffield,58 Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ 
opined that although unreliability is the touchstone of this discretion, S9 
53 R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159, 171-175 (Brennan eJ), 195 (toohey, Gaudron and 
Gummow]J). 
54 Ibid 189 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow J].). 
S5 Ibid 174 (Brennan C)); 189 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow]J), citing Van de Meer 
v The Queen (1998) 62 ALJR 656, 662 (Mason)) and Duf2e v The Queen (1989) 180 
CLR 508,513 (Brennan] dissentim~). 
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it is not the sole underpinning and that another objective sought to be 
achieved through its exercise is to protect the substantive and procedural 
rights of the accused. 60 As this writer has emphasised, a rights protection 
rationale necessarily includes the overriding public interest in deterring 
police misconduct and, in any event, deterrence must always be seen 
as the paramount rationale for the exercise of any rule or discretion to 
exclude evidence obtained as a consequence of deliberate or reckless 
police misconduct. 
In view of these underpinnings, and taking into account that the reliability 
rationale for the exercise of Lee discretion is the only one that has thus 
far garnered a majority of support at the High Court level, the extent to 
which the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine should extend to derivative 
evidence discovered as a result of primary evidence excluded in the 
exercise of Lee discretion, falls to be determined by whether its extension 
is consonant with or inimical to the reliability rationale and the overriding 
precept that exclusion is the ori1y effective means61 of deterring wilful or 
reckless police misconduct and avoiding even the appearance of involving 
the courts in the curial approval of such misconduct.62 Accordingly, just 
as the reliability of derivative real evidence is rarely, if ever, affected by the 
involuntariness of primary confessional evidence, the same can be said of 
derivative real evidence obtained as a consequence of primary confessional 
evidence that is excluded in the exercise of Lee discretion. However, 
as in the case of derivative real evidence obtained as a consequence of 
involuntarily obtained primary confessional evidence, the fact that the 
reliability rationale is inconsistent with its exclusion under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree' doctrine does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it 
should be admitted. To the extent that rights protection may also be a basis 
for the exercise of Lee discretion, and taking into account that deterring 
illegal or hnproper police conduct is always an important undercurrent in 
the exercise of any exclusionary rule or discretion that is predicated upon 
police misconduct, the derivative real eVidence should, in principle, be 
excluded as poisonous fruit. 
The same result should obtain in instances where the derivative evidence 
is confessional in nature. If the same factors which cast sufficient doubt 
concerning the reliability of the primary confessional evidence to warrant 
60 Ibid 197-198 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). The Court did not specify which 
rights were at issue, although one distinguiShed commentator believes that the 
Court's comments were directed at the common law right to remain silent: G Davies, 
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its exclusion remain in effect at the time of the making of the derivative 
confessional evidence, the 'reliability rationale alone would militate in 
favour of its exclusion on two bases: (1) that there is such a serious risk of 
unreliability as to warrant exclusion under the Lee discretion independent 
of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine; and (2) because its exclusion 
as poisonous fruit is also consonant with the reliability touchstone of the 
Lee discretion.63 If the initial police misconduct that created a serious 
risk of unreliability vis-a-vis the primary confessional evidence is no 
longer extant at the time of the making of the derivative confession, nor 
is there subsequent polite misconduct calculated to create a real risk 
that the derivative confessional evidence is unreliable, the application 
or lack thereof of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine should turn 
on whether one subscribes to the view that irrespective of the stated 
rationale for the Lee discretion, deterrence of wilful or reckless police 
misconduct and avoidance of curial approval of the same are always the 
paramount considerations in the exercise of any exclusionary rule or 
discretion that requires or involves police misconduct. On that point, the 
writer has made his view quite clear.64 
B Lee/Unfairness Discretion and Sections 90 and 85 of the UBL 
In jurisdictions that have enacted the DEL, the Lee/fairness discretion 
appears to have been codified by s 90 of the legislation,65 Section 90 
is couched in language that is nearly identical to that of McDermott v 
The Queen and R v Lee, the seminal cases in which the Lee/fairness 
discretion was recognised under the Australian common law doctrine, 
Section 90 states that: 
[i]n a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admiSSion, 
or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if: 
(a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it 
would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence. 
63 The reader should be reminded that any discussion of the applicability of the poison-
ous fruit doctrine assumes that the illegal or improper procurement of the primary 
evidence was a sole, dominant or significant factor in obtaining or discovering the 
disputed evidence. It was noted earlier, for example, that one who confesses involun-
tarily may feel that he or she has nothing to lose by making a subsequent confession 
because the 'cat is out of the bag' so to speak. 
64 In R v Scott [19931 1 Qd R 537 at [539), the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the 
admissibility of derivative real evidence is governed by the Bunning/public policy 
discretion, irrespective of whether or not it was obtained as a consequence of confes-
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Section 85, though worded very differently than s 90, is also concerned 
with the extent to which various factors may have adversely affected 
the reliability of confessional evidence. Section 85 should not be seen, 
however, as a further codification of the Lee discretion due to the 
conspicuous absence of any requirement of police impropriety as a 
prerequisite to its application.66 Another important distinction between 
s 85 and the Lee discretion is that under s 85, and assuming the accused 
can make a prima facie showing that the evidence was given during the 
course of police questioning or as a result of conduct on the part of a 
person or persons who could influence the prosecution, the onus is then 
on the prosecution to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that 
the evidence was obtained under circumstances that were unlikely to 
affect its truthfulness. In the case of Lee discretion, however, the onus is 
on the accused to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that <1;iscretion 
should be exercised in favour of excitision.67 Section 85 provides: 
(1) This section applies only .in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of 
an admission made by a defendant: 
(a) to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time 
was performing fimctions in connection with the investigation of 
the commission, or possible cOmmission, of an offence; or 
(b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the 
defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing 
the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be 
brought or should be continued ... 
(2) Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in 
'which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the 
truth of the admission was adversely affected. 
(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account for the 
purposes of subsection (2), it is to take into account: 
(a) any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the 
admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, 
intellectual or physical disability to wWch the person is or appears 
to l;Je subject; and 
(b) if the admission was made in response to questioning: 
(i) the nature of the questions and the manner in which they 
were put; and 
(li) the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement 
made to the person questioned.6S 
66 R v Braun (unreported) NSWSC (24 October 1997) (Hidden J). Moreover, the fact 
that illegal and improper conduct is a prerequisite to the operation of s 138, another 
exclusionary discretion under the UEL, is further indication that the drafters intended 
to dispense with the reqUirement of illegal or improper conduct in s 85; that is to say 
that the conspicuous absence of these words in s 85 does not appear to be accidental 
or inadvertent. 
67 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512. In this case, the High Court held that 
• ." - ~~ ~~~I"r'I.,. ".",frlt"oce via the exercise of any common law discretion 
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In so far as whether the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine extends to 
evidence derived as a consequence of primary confessional evidence 
excluded in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 90, the very same 
arguments raised earlier with regard to evidence derived as a consequence 
of excluding a primary confession under the Lee/fairness discretion should 
apply.69 Although s 85 should not be viewed as a codification of the Leel 
fairness discretions for reasons noted earlier, it is clear from the language 
of s 85 that its primary focus is on ensuring that unreliable confessional 
evidence is not admitted.70 Consonant with this purpose, s 85 does not 
distinguish between primary and derivative confessional evidence and, 
thus, it appears that in applying s 85, each confession or admission must be 
examined independently in order to determine whether 'the circumstances 
in which the admission [or confession] was made were such as to make 
it unlikely that the truth of the admission [or confession] was adversely 
affected.'71 Mellifont argues, however, that as s 85 is limited to criminal 
proceedings and confessional evidence made during official questioning 
that results from the conduct of a person capable of influencing the 
decision as to whether to prosecute-rights protection and deterrence 
are additional objectives sought to be achieved by s 85.72 To the extent 
that reliability is the focus of s 85, derivative real evidence should rarely be 
excluded through application of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. 
If the derivative evidence is confessional, then reliability, rights protection 
and deterrence must all be factored into the dedsion as to whether 
exclusion is warranted under the poisonous fruit doctrine.73 As noted 
earlier, one does not deter one who acts in a good faith belief that his or 
her conduct is both lawful and proper. Therefore, the deterrence rationale 
has little or no force unless it can be demonstrated that the relevant 
common law rules regarding the admissibility of involuntarily obtained confessional 
evidence. The writer disagrees. Section 84, though different in certain respects than 
the first limb of the voluntariness rule noted earlier, is clearly directed at confessional 
evidence that was brought about to some degree by the types of conduct enumerated 
in the section. Section 85, on the other hand, is concerned with the risks that inhere 
in admitting confessional evidence unless it can be demonstrated that it was obtained 
under circumstances that make it unlikely that its truthfulness was adversely affected. 
Thus, s 85 is more akin to the Lee discretion than any common law or statutory rules 
having to do with excluding confessional evidence obtained involuntarily. 
69 It should be re-emphasised that the writer believes that s 90 was intended to codify 
the Lee/fairness discretion, despite the fact that this view did not gamer the support 
of any of the five justices who considered this question in Em v The Queen (2007) 
232 CLR 67, 8~7 [51], [521 (Gleeson CJ and Heydon]); 105 (Hayne and Gummow 
JJ); 121-127 [179]-[195] (Kirby], dissenting). 
70 Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, Report No 102 (2006) 
ru\ Ql 
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official acted in deliberate or reckless disregard as to whether the conduct 
resulting in the cortfession~ evidence was of that nature. This point is even 
mote poignant when one considers that s 85 does not require a showing 
of illegal or improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials. 
In terms of a rights protection rationale which, according to this writer, 
must include a protective deterrence sanction, the question of whether 
to extend the poisonous fruit doctrine to exclude any subsequent 
confessional evidence should similarly turn on whether the conduct on 
the part of the official who was capable of influencing the decision as to 
whether to prosecute was not only illegal or improper, but also whether he 
or she acted with deliberate or reckless disregard of that fact. Indeed, this 
principle should be applied whenever the deterrence rationale is sought 
to be invoked as a baSis for excluding what would otherwise be legally 
admissible evidence. Thus, this principle applies to all instances in this 
paper where the need to deter police misconduct has been argued as a basis 
for extending the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to evidence derived 
from primary evidence excluded under a common law or statutory rule 
or discretion.As far as the reliability rationale is concerned, the application 
of the poisonous fruit doctrine should tum on whether the factors raising 
doubt as to the reliability of the primary confessional evidence were still 
operating at the time of the derivative confessional evidence. 
As this writer has strongly advanced throughout this paper, deterrence 
should always be regarded as the paramount underpinning of any 
exclusionary rule or discretion that requires or involves illegality or 
impropriety on the part of law enforcement officials. As s 85 does not 
require, but typically includes this type of conduct, the writer believes 
that the question of whether to extend the poisonous fruit doctrine to 
derivative evidence of any type should depend on whether the accused 
can demonstrate that the police not only acted improperly, but did so with 
deliberate or reckless disregard of that conduct. In instances where rights 
protection and deterrence are implicated, it follows that consonant with 
the reasons noted previously, they should trump the reliability rationale, 
notwithstanding the fact that on its face, s 85 is concerned with the 
dangers associated with the admission of unreliable confessional evidence. 
IV THE BUNNING/PUBLIC POLICY DISCRETION 
The first case to recognise an overall discretion to exclude real evidence 
based on public pOlicy considerations was R v Ireland; 74 specifically, 
.,.h", nuhlic policies to be considered were whether, in any given 
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circumstance, the public interest in protecting individuals from unlawful 
or unfair treatment outweighs the competing public interest in bringing 
lawbreakers to justiceJ5 Eight years later in Bunning v Cross,76 the High 
Court reaffirmed the existence of this discretion which, for purposes of 
convenience, will hereafter be referred to as 'the Bunning discretion' 
(also commonly referred to as 'the public policy discretion').77 In 
Bunning, however, the High Court enumerated a litany of considerations 
that must be taken into account in deciding whether to exclude evidence: 
(1) the public int~rest in deterring the police from unlawful, improper78 or 
unfair treatment of the accused; 79 
(2) maintaining the integrity of the judiciary by avoiding the unseemly 
appearance of involving the courts in curial approval of police 
rrllsconduct;80 
(3) the public interest in ensuring that those who commit crimes are brought 
to justice;81 
(4) whether the unlawful, improper or unfair conduct was serious, frequent 
or deliberate nature as opposed to being minor, isolated and inadvertent; 82 
(5) the extent to which the admission of the tainted evidence would 
undermine the purpose of the law or policy alleged to have been breached 
by the police;&~ 
(6) the effect, if any, of the unlawful, improper or unfair police conduct upon 
the reliability of the evidence in question;84 
(7) the availability to the prosecution of other, non-tainted evidence through 
which it could prove the fact or facts sought to be proved by the tainted 
eVidence;85 and 
(8) the seriousness of the crime or crimes with which the accused is 
charged.86 
Though not specifically stated by the Court in Bunning, the first three of 
these factors appear to be the paramount considerations underlying the 
discretion. As will become apparent, however, the last factor may well be 
the predominant one in instances involving particularly serious crimes. 
Further, and in stark contrast to the Lee/fairness discretion, the central 
focus of the Bunning discretion is not fairness to the accused, but 
whether the seriousness and frequency of the illegal, improper or unfair 
75 R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321,335. 
76 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. 
77 R v Swaftield (1998) 192 CLR 159. 176-78 (Brennan Cn; see also Bunning v Cross 
(1978) 141 CLR 54, 73 [25]. 
78 Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177,202 (Deane)). 
79 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54,75 (Stephen and AickinJ). with whom Barwick 
CJ concurred). 
80 Ibid 74-75 (Stephen and AickinJJ). 
81 Ibid 72 (Stephen and Aickin)]). 
82 Ibid 78 (Stephen and Aickin JJ). 
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conduct is such as to outweigh the public interest in bringing those who 
commit crimes to justice.87 It is also noteworthy that in Cleland v The 
Queen,88 the High Court held that the Bunning discretion applies to 
both real as well as confeSSional type evidence.89 
The aforementioned factors indicate that one of the underpitll1ings of 
the Bunning discretion is the reliability (or fairness) rationale which 
is expressed in terms of the extent, if any, to which the impugned 
conduct may have affected the reliability of the evidence in question. 
It was previously noted that reliability is rarely a factor in instances 
where real evidence is concerned. The reliability rationale can, however, 
be an important undercurrent when the disputed evidence is of the 
confessional genre as there is little question that the illegal, improper 
or unfair means by which this type of evidence is procured can have an 
adverse affect on its truthfulness. Another underpinning of the Bunning 
discretion is rights protection and its concomitant sanction of exclusion 
as a means of deterring further breaches of the right or policy in question. 
Further) and irrespective of any deterrence objective emanating from the 
rights protection rationale, are the intertwined objectives of deterring 
police misconduct· and maintaining the integrity of the judiciary by 
avoiding either the reality or appearance of involving the courts in curial 
approval of the illegal, improper or unfair means by which the evidence 
was obtained. Finally, the public interest in bringing the gUilty to justice 
is among the most important undercurrents of the Bunning discretion 
and, more importantly, the one against which the others are weighed in 
determining the admissibility of the disputed evidence. 
Although it would be incongruous to describe factors 4, 5, 7 and 8 as 
actual underpinnings for this discretion, it is apposite to say that to varying 
degrees which depend on the peculiar facts of any given case, they 
clearly impact the weight to be ascribed to the veritable underpinnings 
expressed in factors 1,2,3 and 6. In the Introduction to this paper, for 
example, it was stated that empirical evidence demonstrates that in 
instances involving particularly heinous crimes, the seriousness of the 
crime (factor 8) generally overrides all other relevant considerations that 
counsel the exercise of the discretion. 90 Also previously noted is that the 
objective of deterring police misconduct, a major underpinning of all 
the exclusionary rules and discretions examined above, is never served 
87 Cleland v lbe Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1, 34 (Deane J); see also Pollard v The Queen 
(1992) 176 CLR 177,196,203-204. 
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through imposing sanctions (such as exclusion of evidence) unless the 
putative offending official acted with deliberate or reckless disregard of 
the law or public policy at issue.91 
Notwithstanding the above-stated underpinnings and the factors which 
impact them, the High Court has made several pronouncements to the 
effect that maintaining the integrity of the courts through avoidance of 
involving them in curial approval of police misconduct (factor 2) is the 
paramount underpinning of the discretion.92 Thus. the essence of the 
Bunning discretion is to balance factors 1, 2 and 6 against the public 
interest in bringing those who commit crimes to justice, albeit keeping in 
mind that maintaining the integrity of the judiciary is the core foundation 
for the existence of the discretion. 
A Bunning/Public Policy Discretion and the Fruit of the Poisonous 
Tree Doctrine 
To the extent that reliability is an underpinning of the Bunning 
discretion, it was noted earlier that police misconduct seldom affects the 
reliability of derivative real evidence. Thus, if an argument for applying 
the poisonous fruit doctrine exists in the context of the Bunning 
discretion, it would be limited to instances in which the derivative 
evidence consists of confessional evidence. It was also noted earlier that 
if the misconduct creating a serious risk that the primary confessional 
evidence is unreliable continues to exist at the time of the making of a 
derivative confession, both should be excluded under the Lee/fairness 
discretion and the derivative confessional evidence should also be 
excluded under the poisonous fruit doctrine.93 Though the reliability 
(fairness) rationale is not the primary foundation for the exercise of the 
Bunning discretion, in an instance such as this there is a considerable 
overlap between the two discretions . 
. In the ovelWhelming majority of cases, therefore, the decision as to 
. whether to exclude evidence via the Bunning discretion will be 
··determined on the basis of whether factors 1 and 2 outweigh 3. Factors 
·.4,5,7 and 8, though they are not in and of themselves underpinnings 
,'of the Bunning discretion, impact heavily upon this balancing process. 
91 Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177, 203-204 (Deane]). For acJear definition of 
'reckless disregard' under common law doctrine, see LaFave et aI, above n 61, 21-2. 
92 Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 eLR 177,202-204 (DeaneJ); Ridgeway v The Queen 
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Thus, the related underpinnings of avoiding the reality or appearance 
of involving the courts in curial approval of pOlice misconduct and in 
deterring the same are inextricably intertwined with factor 4: whether 
the misconduct was of a serious, frequent and deliberate as opposed to 
a minor, isolated and inadvertent nature.Aside from the consideration of 
the seriousness of the police misconduct at issue, this is another means 
of re-stating one of the recurring and essential themes of this paper; 
specifically, that the objective of deterrence is generally not served by 
sanctioning police misconduct without a showing that the police acted 
in deliberate or reckless disregard of the contravened law or policy. 
Similarly, without such a .showing, the sanction of exclusion does not 
further the objective of avoiding the reality or appearance of involving 
the courts in curial approval of the misconduct. Thus, if it is found that 
the police acted in a good faith belief that their conduct was entirely 
legal and proper, this militates heavily against exclusion of the disputed 
evidence based on the rationales set forth in factors 1 or 2. Finally, the 
seriousness of the rule of law or policy that was breached is justifiably 
taken into account in the balancing of factors that govern the exercise 
of this discretion. 
In addition, whether there is other, non-tainted evidence available to the 
prosecution through which it could prove the same disputed facts will 
always be an important factor in balancing factors 1 and 2 against 3. If 
the answer is in the affirmative, this militates in favour of exclusion and, 
of course, the reverse is true if the question is answered in the negative. 
As with factor 4, factor 7 is also heavily related to factor 1. It has been 
stressed time and again throughout this paper that, in general, imposing 
any type of sanction on those who violate a law or policy will not serve 
the objective of deterring future violations unless it can be demonstrated 
that the violator(s) acted with deliberate or reckless disregard for the law 
or pOlicy in question. Thus, whether admission of the disputed evidence 
will tend to frustrate the purpose of the contravened law or policy will 
depend largely upon whether the pOlice misconduct was a product of 
good or bad faith. 
Finally, one cannot understate the extent to which the seriousness of the 
crime at issue (factor 8) impacts on the underpinning of the public interest 
in bringing the guilty to justice. Readers will recall from the Introduction 
to this paper that empirical evidence demonstrates that regardless of 
which exclusionary rule or discretion is involved, the Australian courts 
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so heavily in buttressing the importance of the need to bring the guilty 
to justice that in all but a handful of exceptional cases, it tips the balance 
in favour of admitting the incriminating evidence.94 AB one distinguished 
commentator has pointed out in relation to the Bunning discretion, '[t] 
he judicial integrity principle calls for the exclusion of the derivative 
evidence where the primary evidence is excluded, unless the particular 
case presents factors specific to the derivative evidence which tip the 
balance back in favour of admission' .95 Although this writer believes that 
the above quotation would have been more accurate if it had mentioned 
both the deterrence and judicial integrity objectives, the basic premise is 
nonetheless consonant with the empirical evidence. If the alleged crime 
is regarded as one of the more egregious known to the criminal law, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that this circumstance 'presents factors 
specific to the derivative evidence which tip the balance back in favour 
of admission' .96 
On the other hand, there is a cogent and often overlooked argument 
that the more serious the nature of the crime, the greater the need to 
stringently enforce all rules and discretions that are designed to safeguard 
the rights of the accused and ensure that those entrusted with the 
responsibility of enforcing the law do not resort to violating the same as 
a means to that end.97 The more serious the crime, the greater the stakes 
94 LaFav et al, above n 61, vol 2,21-2. 
95 MeIlifont, above n 1, 142. 
96 Ibid. In R v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169, 171, Spigelman CJ, with whom Blanch 
J concurred, opined that in murder prosecutions, the seriousness of the crime is a 
factor that militates strongly in favour of admissibility. See also R v Theophanous 
[2003] VSCA 78 (163)-[164] (Winneke AC], Vincent and Eames ]]A): '[e]ven if that 
evidence was assumed to have been procured by unlawful or improper conduct the 
public interest in exposure of such a serious offence outweighed the public interest 
in e:s:pressing curial disapproval of the investigative process adopted'. Other cases 
in which Similar sentiments were expressed include R v Stubbs [2009] ACTSC 63, 
where, on a charge of procuring a person under 16 to engage in or submit to sexual 
activity, Higgins CJ opined at [67]-[70]: 'Even if Detective Waugh could have been 
regarded as aiding and abetting the accused's allegedly offensive communications, I 
would have exercised the s 138 discretion in favour of the admission of the evidence 
he so obtained ... The evil to be confronted by this kind of investigation is of high pub-
lic importance ... The Gospel of St Matthew records Christ as condemning those who 
would corrupt the young in the following tenus: "18:6 But who so shall offend one 
of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were 
hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea (see Mark 
9:42, Luke 17:2)". That, I think reflects the community attitude toward such offences 
and such offenders'. For an interesting commentary on the notion that application of 
the American exclusionary rule should be contingent on balancing the seriousness of 
the crime and the magnitude of the constitutional violation, see LaFave et ai, above n 
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are for both the prosecution and the accused. Because law enforcement 
officials regard the necessity of securing convictions as particularly high 
in cases involving the most serious crimes, this can only provide an 
added incentive to resort to any available tactics to achieve that end. If 
the police are aware that illegal or improper tactics will be overlooked 
by the courts in the most serious cases due to a perceived greater need 
to bring the gUilty to justice, the inevitable result will be that evidence 
will be increasingly obtained through extralegal or improper means. 
Keeping in mind that our adversarial system of justice is concerned 
with not only reaching the truth, but also the means by which it is 
accomplished, nothing could be mote inimical to the latter concern than 
allowing the police, with ~e facto approval from the courts, to benefit 
from their deliberate or reckless disregard of the law or imponant public 
interests in prosecutions for the most serious offences. According to an 
old aphorism, when people start giving up a little bit of liberty in order 
to get a little more security, they will soon have neither. In the writer's 
view, this proverb is not only correct, but if not heeded will eventually 
transform our society ~nto a fascist one of men and not laws. 
If the various Australian Parliaments truly accept the proposition that 
our exclusionary rules and discretions, however important, should be 
subordinated to the interest of admitting incriminating evidence in trials 
where the most serious offences are alleged, they should display the 
courage to expressly legislate that probative evidence of guilt in such 
prosecutions, irrespective of how illegal, improper or unfair the means 
by which it is obtained, must be admitted on the basis that the public 
interest in bringing the gUilty to justice places the evidence outside the 
scope of any exclusionary rules or discretions.98 Expressly legislating this 
would, however, expose our exclusionary rules and discretions for what 
they are and free our courts from merely paying mere lip service to them 
for reasons of obvious political correctness. It can hardly be denied that 
the average citizen, lacking in both knowledge and training in the law, 
would understand, much less sympathise with the pinnacle of political 
the law will be more readily condoned. ln my judgment there may be cases in which 
the fact that the charge is a serious one will result in a more rigorous insistence on 
compliance with statutory provisions concerning the obtaining of evidence. That a 
person is under suspicion for a serious offence does not confer a licence to contra· 
vene laws designed to ensure fairness.' 
98 R v Howe [1987) AC 417, 433. In this case, Lord Hailsham made reference to the no-
tion that the ends justify the means and called it a 'disreputable principle'. Although 
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incorrectness in excluding highly probative evidence of gUilt in such 
cases,99 regardless of the means by which it was obtained. 
Aside from cases in which the Lee and Bunning discretions overlap, 
the latter discretion entails a balancing of factors 1 and 2 against 3 and, 
on that basis, deciding whether to admit evidence notwithstanding the 
illegal, improper or unfair means by which it was obtained. This writer 
adheres to the view that if we are truly a society of laws and not of men 
that is just as concerned with the means by which the truth is sought 
as it is with reaching the truth, then deterrence must be the paramount 
underpinning of all exclusionary rules and discretions which involve 
the police in deliberate or reckless disregard of the law or public policy 
that renders their conduct illegal, improper or unfair. Thus, despite the 
many factors that counsel the exercise of the Bunning discretion, the 
most important and immutable fact is that unless the law affords an 
effective deterrent against police lawlessness or impropriety, the police 
will have every incentive to resort to such tactics. The test of time has 
demonstrated that the only effective deterrent against police misconduct 
in obtaining evidence is to institute a prophylactic rule of exclusion that 
extends to both the primary evidence as well as its derivative fruits. 100 
To be sure, derivative evidence discovered as a result of illegally or 
improperly obtained primary evidence can be just as damning, and in 
some cases more so, than the primary evidence. If, for example, the 
police illegally search a home without a warrant or other legal means 
and discover an incriminating letter therein, the letter may lead them to 
other far more incriminating derivative evidence such as a dead body 
99 See, for example, R v Heaney [1992) 2 VR 531, in which a patently illegal order 
transferring the accused into the custody of investigating officers for a second inter-
rogation relating to the same offence, not to mention a failUre to give proper warn-
ings prior to the interrogation following the transfer order, were found insufficient 
to justify exclusion of the resulting confessional evidence. With regard to the illegal 
transfer order, the Court of Appeal brushed aside the Bunning discretion with a sim-
ple proclamation that it was undoubtedly the result of an inadvertent error by the 
police, thereby negating any argument that the police acted in deliberate or reckless 
disregard of the rule: at 555 (Phillips C), Crockett and Q'Bryan JJ). As for the failure 
to warn as mandated by statute, the Court opined that exclusion under the Bunning 
discretion was also inappropriate because the accused had received the warnings 
prior to the first interrogation and, therefore, it could be safely assumed that she 
was already aware of her rights. It should come as no surprise that the accused was 
charged with murder, thus providing a powerful incentive for the Court to reach this 
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and a murder weapon bearing both the accused's fingerprints and blood 
matching the DNA profile of the accused, otherwise known as the 'fruit 
of the poisonous tree'. Unless the poisonous fruit doctrine is applied 
to all evidence derived from illegally or improperly obtained primary 
evidence, the police will have everything to gain and little or nothing to 
lose by resorting to lawlessness in obtaining the primary evidence.This is 
because the police will be well aware that the worst case scenario is that 
the primary evidence will be excluded with a real possibility that it will 
lead to the discovery of incriminating derivative evidence which, but-
for the illegal or improper obtaining of the excluded primary evidence, 
would not have been discovered. Unless the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine is extended to all evidence derived from primary evidence 
excluded under one or more of the Australian exclusionary rules or 
discretions, the police will often stand to benefit from the deliberate or 
reckless disregard of the law or public policy that renders their conduct 
illegal, improper or unfair. For the reasons set forth above, this would be 
a most unfortunate result that would not only send us down the slippery 
slope toward fasCism, but make a mockery of the notion that we are 
foremost a society of laws and not of men. 101 
There is another troubling issue that cannot be overlooked in discussing 
the foregoing exclusionary rules and discretions: police perjury. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases in which evidence is sought to be 
excluded under one or more of the exclusionary rules or discretions, 
the matter is determined summarily by a magistrate or judge at a pre-
trial hearing. In many instances, the decision as to whether to exclude 
will turn on a factual finding; that is, which version of events the court 
finds more credible: the police officer's version or that of the accused. 
Although police officers generally receive far less training in matters of 
law than lawyers, they are typically far more knowledgeable than the 
average citizen who has typically received little or no legal education. 
Thus, the police are often well aware that illegal or improper conduct can 
be transformed into what will be seen as exemplary conduct by making 
small, albeit crucial changes in their sworn testimony as to how the 
events in question unfolded. If, for example, a search of a vehicle leading 
to the discovery of incriminating evidence would have been illegal in 
the absence of the vehicle owner's consent to search, what, aside from 
honesty and integrity, is there to prevent a police officer from giving false 
testimony that the owner consented to the search? As any experienced 
criminal practitioner is acutely aware, the police often testify to events 
that are not only false; but beyond improbable on their face. 
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In an ideal world, one would expect magistrates and judges to reject such 
perjured and improbable testimony. In practice, however, it has been 
the writer's experience and that of numerous colleagues, that too often 
magistrates and judges cannot resist the temptation to pretend to believe 
the police rather than incur the wrath of an angry press and citizenry 
for taking the correct, but politically unthinkable measure of fmding 
the accused's version of the events to be true and, as a consequence) 
excluding incriminating evidence. Simply stated, it has not been the 
experience of this writer or his friends and colleagues, many of whom 
are former police officers, that the word of a civilian will be accorded 
the same weight as that of a law enforcement officer, regardless of the 
implausibility of the latter's account of the events in question. This 
deplorable reality is best summed up by Professor Alan Dershowitz in his 
book, The Best Defense. 102 A professor of law at Harvard University and 
one of America's top appellate lawyers, Professor Dershowitz enumerates 
what he describes as the '[t]he Rules of the Justice Game'. These rules 
provide: 
Rule I: Almost all criminal defendants are, in fact, gUilty. 
Rule II: All criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges understand and 
believe Rule I. 
Rule III: It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating the Constitution 
than by complying with it, and in some cases it is impossible to 
convict guilty defendants without violating the Constitution. 
Rule TV: almost 'all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in 
order to convict gUilty defendants. 
Rule V: All prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule Iv. 
Rule VI: Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie about whether 
they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants; 
Rule VII: All judges are aware of Rule VI. 
Rule VIII: Most trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know 
are lying. 
Rule IX: All appellate judges are aware of Rule VIII, yet many pretend to believe 
the trial judges who pretend to believe the lying pOlice officers. 
Rule X: Most judges disbelieve defendants about whether their constitutional 
rights have been Violated, even if they are telling the truth. 
Rule XI: Most judges and prosecutors would not knowingly convict a 
defendant who they believe to be innocent of the crime charged (or 
a closely related crime). 
Rule XII: Rule XI does not apply to members of organized crime, drug dealers, 
career criminals, or potential informers. 
Rule XIII: Nobody really wants justice. 103 
102 Alan M Dershowitz, The Best Defense (Vintage, 1983). 
103 Dershowitz, above n 102, xxi-xxii. While the writer's experiences comport with 
the rules he sets forth above, it should come as no surprise to readers that this book 
and many others authored by Professor Dershowitz have come under attack for any 
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B Bunning Discretion and Sections 138 and 
139 o/the UEL 
Sections 9 (extracted above), 138 and 139 of the UEL have substantially 
codified the Bunning/public policy discretion. Sections 138 and 139 
provide as follows: 
Section 138 Exclusion of impropedy or illegally obtajned evidence 
(1) Evidence that was obtained: 
(a) improperly or in contravention of an Australian law. or 
(b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an 
Australian law, is not to be admitted unless the desirability of 
admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting 
evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence 
was obtained. 
(2) Without li.miting subsection (1), evidence of an admission that was made 
during or in consequence of questioning, and evidence obtained in 
consequence of the admission, is taken to have been obtained improperly 
if the person conducting the questioning: 
(a) did, or omitted to do, an act in the course of the questioning even 
though he or she knew or ought reasonably to have known that 
the act or omission was likely to impair substantially the ability 
of the person being questioned to respond rationally to the 
questioning; or 
(b) made a false statement in the course of the questioning even 
though he or she knew or ought reasonably to have known that 
the statement was false and that making the false statement was 
likely to cause the person who was being questioned to make an 
admission. 
(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account under 
subsection (l), it is to take into account: 
(a) the probative value of the evidence; and 
(b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; and 
(c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and 
the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and 
(d) the gravity of the impropriety or contravention; and 
(e) whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or 
reckless; and 
(t) whether the impropriety or contravention was contrary to 
or inconSistent with a right of a person recognised by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and 
(g) whether any other proceeding (whether or not in a court) has 
been or is likely to be taken in relation to the impropriety or 
contravention; and 
(h) the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without 
impropriety or contravention of an Australian law. 
Section 139 Cautioning of persons 
(1) For the purposes of paragraph I 38(1)(a), evidence of a statement made or 
an act done by a person during questioning is taken to have been obtained 
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held, to arrest the person; and 
(c) before starting the questioning the investigating official did not 
caution the person that the person does not have to say or do 
anything but that anything the person does say or do may be used 
in evidence. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 138(l)(a), evidence of a statement made or 
an act done by a person during questioning is taken to have been obtained 
improperly if: 
(a) the questioning was conducted by an investigating official who 
did not have the power to arrest the person; and 
(b) the statement was made, or the act was done, after the investigating 
dffidal formed a belief that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish that the person has committed an offence; and 
(c) the investigating official did not, before the statement was made 
or the act was done, caution the person that the person does not 
have to sayar do anything but that anything the person does say 
or do may be used in evidence. 
(3) The caution must be given in, or translated into, a language in which the 
person is able to communicate with reasonable fluency, but need not be 
given in writing unless the person cannot hear adequately. 
(4) Subsections 0), (2) and (3) do not apply so far as any Australian law 
requires the person to answer questions put by, or do things required by, 
the investigating official. 
(5) A reference in subsection (1) to a person who is under arrest includes a 
reference to a person who is in the company of an investigating official for 
the purpose of being questioned, if: 
(a) the official believes that there is sufficient evidence to establish 
that the person has committed an offence that is to be the subject 
of the questioning; or 
(b) the official would not allow the person to leave if the person 
wished to do so; or 
(c) the official has given the person reasonable grounds for believing 
that the person would not be allowed to leave if he or she wished 
to do so. 
(6) A person is not treated as being under arrest only because of subsection (5) 
if: 
(a) the official is performing functions in relation to persons or 
goods entering or leaving Australia and the official does not 
believe the person has committed an offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth; or 
(b) the official is exercising a power under an Australian law to 
detain and search the person or to require the person to provide 
information or to answer questions. 
Section 138(1) enunciates a test for admission which, at least on its 
face, differs somewhat from the balanCing of the 8 factors enunciated in 
Bunning and its progeny. Although the Bunning discretion most often 
turns on a balancing of factors 1 and 2 against 3 (which are influenced 
by factors 4,5,7 and 8), s 138(1) provides that evidence obtained illegally 
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factors to be considered in applying this balancing test are set forth in s 
138(3)(a)-(h).104 Although these factors essentially mirror those which 
counsel the Bunning discretion, noticeably absent is the extent to 
which the illegal or improper conduct may have affected the reliability 
of the evidence (fairness) in question. It may be that this factor is 
encompassed in sub-s 138(3 ) (a) which requires that the 'probative value 
of the evidence' be taken into account in the aforementioned balancing 
test. If so, then the factors enumerated in sub-ss 138(3)(a)-(h) must be 
viewed as substantially codifying those which must be conSidered in 
the exercise of the common law Bunning discretion. lOS If not, then 
this must be seen as a departure from the Bunning discretion. In either 
case, readers should recall that this factor is rarely relevant in instances 
where real as opposed to confessional evidence is concerned. 
An important difference between s 138 and the common law Bunning 
discretion is that in cases involving the latter, the challenged evidence 
is presumptively admissible, subject to exclusion under the discretion. 
In sharp contrast, evidence challenged under s 138 is presumptively 
inadmissible, subject to discretionary inclusion with the onus of proof 
on the prosecution to justify admission. 106 The rationale for this shift in 
policy is that those who violate the law should bear the onus of justifying 
admission and, furthermore, that the infrequency of discretionary 
exclusion of evidence under the common law Bunning discretion serves 
to buttress the notion that placing the onus of proof on the accused 
to exclude the evidence tips the scale too heavily in favour of the 
prosecution. 107 
In addition, s 138 differs from the common law Bunning discretion in that 
sub-s8 138(2)(a) and (b) expressly deem that admissions made during or 
in consequence of questioning and evidence obtained as a consequence 
of such an admission shall be deemed to be improperly obtained if the 
person who conducted the questioning acted in a manner set forth 
in the foregoing sub·sections. Finally, these sub-sections represent the 
first Australian statutory or common law recognition of what at least 
resembles a fruit of the poisonous tree principle; that is to say that if an 
admission made during or in consequence of the type of questioning 
104 The factors enumerated in both Bunning and s 138(3)(a)-(h) have been held to be 
non-exhaustive: R v Rooke (unreported) NSWCCA, 2 September 1997, BC9703981) 
(Barr J with whom Newman and Levine JJ concurred). 
105 Readers should be aware that s 137 of the UEL accords trial judges with discretion 
to exclude evidence tendered by the prosecution whenever its probative value is 
outweighed by its tendency to unfairly prejudice the accused. Thus, if illegally or iru-
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set forth in these sub-sections is thereby deemed to have been obtained 
improperly, so too will any other evidence, real or confessional, that was 
obtained as a consequence of that admission. This represents another 
important distinction between s 138 and the common law Bunning 
discretion. That said, it would be inaccurate to state that s 138(3)(a) and 
(b) are a partial codification of the American 'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine. This is because the effect of these sub-sections is merely to 
deem, as improperly obtained, any derivative evidence flowing from the 
primary admission that is also deemed to have been improperly obtained 
under sub-sections (a) and (b).The fact that evidence is obtained illegally 
or improperly under s 138 does not, however, render it inadmissible per 
se.As noted above, a fmding that evidence was so obtained is a necessary, 
but not sufficient circumstance to warrant the exercise of the discretion 
to exclude it under s 138. Rather, the next and [mal step is to apply the 
balancing test enunciated in s 138(1) which takes into account the non-
exhaustive factors set out in s 138(3)(a)-(h). 
Section 139 should be read in conjunction with s 138. In particular, 
s 139 represents yet another statute under which admissions made or 
acts done during the course of questioning are deemed to have been 
improperly obtained. In particular, admissions made or acts done during 
the course of questioning will be deemed to have been improperly 
obtained if the questioning was not preceded by warning the suspect 
of the right of silence and that any statements made can be given in 
evidence. In order for these deeming provisions to apply, however, the 
suspect must have been under arrest and questioned by an investigating 
offiCial empowered to make an arrest of the suspect; or, the suspect must 
have been questioned by an investigating official who lacked the power 
to arrest the suspect and the statement was made or the act was done 
after the investigating official formed a belief that there was suffiCient 
evidence to establish that the suspect committed an offence. 
There is little question that under the laws and various Police 
Commissioners' Standing Orders in all Australian jurisdictions, a failure to 
warn of the right to silence prior to questioning, standing alone, would 
be regarded as illegal or improper conduct under the common law 
Bunning discretion. Thus, these deeming provisions should be seen as 
a codification of circumstances that would be regarded as improper at 
common law for purposes of both the Bunning and Lee discretions. If 
s 139 applies, the question to then be decided is whether the improperly 
obtained evidence should be admitted or excluded under the balancing 
test set forth in s 138(1). 
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(h)) under the balancing test of s 138(1) bear a striking similarity to 
the underpinnings of the Bunning discretion and the various other 
considerations that factor into its balancing exercise. It is apparent that as 
with the Bunning discre:tion, the underpinnings of s 138 are deterrence of 
police misconduct, maintaining the integrity of the judiciary by avoiding 
the appearance or reality of curial approval of such misconduct, the need 
to convict the guilty, and to a limited extent the notion of fairness, at 
least in so far as the degree to which the misconduct impacts on the 
reliability of the disputed evidence. Thus, the writer's view is that the 
very same arguments made in support of applying the poisonous fruit 
doctrine to any derivative evidence emanating from primary evidence 
excluded under the Bunni1'fg discretion should apply with equal force 
to ss 138 and 139 of the UEL. 
It is important to emphasise that the words 'reckless' and 'recklessness' 
have been used repeatedly throughout this paper and the word 'reckless' 
appears in s 138(3)(e) of the UEL. At common law, this term denotes 
an aggravated form of negligence in which the actor consciously 
adverts to an unreasonable risk of harm to another or others, yet opts to 
proceed in the face of that risk without actually intending to cause the 
contemplated harm.I08 It is the actor'S advertence to the risk, coupled 
with the subsequent commission or omission to act, that distinguishes 
recklessness from criminal or ordinary types of negligence in which 
the actor did not advert, but a hypothetical reasonable person would 
have adverted to the risk and taken appropriate measures to minimise or 
avoid it.109 On the other hand, some jurists have expressed a far broader 
view of what constitutes recklessness. In DPP v Leonard,110 for example, 
James J opined that one acts with recklessness in violating the law if he 
or she fails to give any thought as to whether there is a risk that his or her 
conduct is illegal. 111 The writer's view is that the concept of recklessness 
advanced by James J cannot be reconciled with settled common law 
doctrine and, therefore, represents an erroneous statement of law. 
108 See DPP v Nicholls (2001) 123 A Crim R 66, 76 [23] (Adams D. For a dear and thor-
ough discussion of recklessness and other forms of mens rea known to the criminal 
law, see P Gillies, Criminal Law (Law Book, 4th ed, 1997) 46-73. See also KJ Arenson 
~nli M Ra2aric. Criminal Laws in Australia: Cases and Materials (Oxford University 
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V THE AMERICAN ExCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE 
Under the United States Constitution, the first ten amendments are 
referred to as the Bill of Rights. 112 Though the rights enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights were once thought to be safeguarded only against infringement 
by the federal government,113 under what is termed the 'incorporation 
doctrine' , nearly all of the rights set out in these amendments are now 
protected from state encroachment as well via the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 In both state and federal criminal 
prosecutions, therefore, the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments accord 
many important constitutional protections to the accused. The Fourth 
Amendment, for example, reposes important restrictions on when and 
how searches and seizures of persons and things can be effectuated by 
state and federal officials. 115 The Fifth Amendment accords the accused 
with several rights, the most important of which for present purposes is 
the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself, otherwise 
known as the right against self-incrimination.1 l6 The Sixth Amendment 
112 JE Nowak and RD Rotunda, Constitutional Law (West Publishing, 4th ed, 1991) 331. 
113 Barron v Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 US (7 Pet) 243,247 (1833). 
114 Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 147-148, 171 (1968); see generally Nowak and 
Rotunda, above n 112, 332 n 3. 
115 United States Constitution, amend IV. In Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655 (1961), 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
was held to be applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
116 United States Constitution, amend V. In Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1 at 3 (1964), the 
Self-InCrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was held to be applicable to the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Miranda v Arizo-
na, 384 US 436 at 478-79 (1966), a case with which most Australians are familiar, the 
United States Supreme Court held that anytime a person is under arrest or deprived 
of his or her freedom in any significant manner, any questioning of that person must 
be preceded by warnings to the effect that he or she has a right to remain silent, any 
statements made may be given in evidence against him or her, he or she has a right to 
have counsel present during questioning, and that counsel will be appointed if he or 
she cannot afford to retain one at his or her own expense. Like the Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth amendments, Miranda has an exclusionary rule that applies to exclude testimo-
nial or conununicative (which includes confessional evidence or incriminating docu-
ments) evidence obtained in instances where the required warnings are not given 
prior to questioning. There is a conflict of authority at the United States Supreme 
Court level as to whether the Miranda exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination or merely a judiciaUy-created rule that is 
designed to protect that right. If it is the former, then evidence obtained in breach of 
the Miranda rule amounts to a constitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment; if it is 
the latter, evidence obtained in breach of Miranda is a violation of a judiciaIly-created 
rule. Although the fonner view was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
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also confers many invaluable rights on the accused, including the right to 
be represented by counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 117 
A complete explanation of the scope of these rights is far too complex for 
an article of this type and, in any event, certainly beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, attention will focus on what is termed the 'exclusionary 
rule' which is not only an essential component of these rights, but a 
mechanism designed to aid in their enforcement by excluding all forms of 
evidence obtained through infringements of the same by state and federal 
action. J 18 As part and parcel of the exclusionary rule, there is a prohibition 
against the use of all evidence discovered as a consequence Of such 
infringements that is known as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree'doctrine.119 
In this context, the term 'poisonous tree' denotes unconstitutional state or 
federal action such an all illegal arrest, search, interrogation or identification 
procedure. The expression 'fruit of the poisonous tree', on the other hand, 
refers to the tainted evidence resulting from the 'poisonous tree', whether 
it is primary or derivative in nature. 120 As will be discussed below, however, 
over the past three decades the United States Supreme Court has severely 
emasculated the exclusionary rule by carving out at least four exceptions 
that allow for the admission of such fruits irrespective of the fact that 
they were obtained in contravention of the aforementioned constitutional 
strictures. III Although these exceptions appear to be based on sound 
reasoning and legitimate public policy considerations, in the view of many 
they represent nothing more than a shift in the political ideology of the 
justices appointed to the Court during the period from 1969 through 1991, 
all of whom were appointed by conservative republican presidents.122 
A The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the 
ExclUSionary Rule 
The Fourth, Fifth and SixthAmendments to the United States Constitution 
provide in pertinent pa.rt: 
to confessional or real evidence will not be undertaken. However, for a thorough and 
insightful discussion of the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule, see LaFave et aI, 
above n 61, vol 3, 466-85. 
117 United States Constitution, amend VI. The Sixth amendment right to the Assistance 
of Counsel was made applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 342-345 (1963). 
118 LaFave et ai, above n 61, vol 2, 7-9. 
119 Mellifont, above n 1,72. 
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Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affinnation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. 
Amendment V 
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself ... 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
In Weeks v United States,123 the United States Supreme Court held that 
under the exclusionary rule and its attendant 'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine, all evidence (primary or derivative,124 confessional or real)12S 
obtained by federal officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
inadmissible at trial. 126 As noted above, in Mapp v Ohio the protections 
accorded via the Fourth Amendment were later held to be safeguarded 
against infringement by state officials as well. 127 The scope and 
underpinning of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was adroitly 
expressed by Kerri Mellifont: 
The FourthAmendment exclusionary rule is a rule of peremptory exclusion. Once 
it is established that the evidence has been obtained in breach of the Fourth 
Amendment, the. rule operates to exclude that evidence, whether it be confessional 
or real, and whether it be primary or derivative. That it encompasses derivative 
evidence as well as primary evidence was the subject of clear judicial statement 
from the very early stages of the exclusionary rule's development. In 1920, in 
Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States ... Holmes J held that not only was the 
government precluded from admitting the illegally seized primary real evidence 
in the trial, but it was precluded from gaining any further legal advantage from its 
seizure. Holmes J contended that admitting evidence derived in consequence of 
the seizure of the primary evidence would impermiSSibly allow the government 
to gain a legal advantage from the contravention of the Fourth Amendment. This 
would be contrary to the exclusionary rule which mandates not merely that 
evidence acquired in breach of the Fourth Amendment shall not be used before 
123 Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 (1914). 
124 Silverthorne Lumber Co, 251 US 385, 391-392 (1920) (Holmes]). 
125 Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471,485 (1963) (BrennanD. 
126 Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 393-394 (1914) (Day J). 
127 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643,655 (1961). But in United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 
348 (1974), a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 
rule was not an actual part of the Fourth Amendment; rather, it was merely a judicial-
ly-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. This view was 
later reaffirmed by the Court in United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984). In Sanchez-
Llamas v Oregon, 126 S Ct 2669 (2006), however, this view was rejected by the 
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the court, but rather that it shall not be used at all. The exclusionary rule itself, 
therefore, "reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an 
illegal search or seizure, but also to evidence later discovered to be derivative of 
an illegality. To use American terminology, 'the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine' 
prohibits the use of all evidence uncovered as a result of the initial unlawful police 
conduct. 128 
It is apparent, therefore, that deterrence is the underlying rationale for 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and, further, the application of 
the rule to both primary as well as derivative evidence is consistent with 
the deterrence rationale. To be sure, if the rule did not apply to derivative 
evidence, an incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment would remain 
due to the prospect of discovering derivative evidence that would be 
admissible at trial. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been held to apply at all 
'critical stages' of a criminal prosecution. 129 The term 'critical stage' 
denotes all stages at which a lawyer's presence is essential in order to 
protect the accused's right to a fair triaL 130 Some examples of 'critical 
stages' are preliminary hearings, some forms of identification procedures 
(identification parades), attempts by prosecutors or police to elicit 
incriminating statements and, of course) criminal trials. 131 As with the 
Fourth Amendment, there is an exclusionary rule that applies to both 
primary as well as derivative evidence obtained as a result of violating 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Thus, if an accused's request to 
be represented by counsel during an identification parade or police 
interrogation is denied, any resulting identification or confession will 
be excluded as poisonous fruit, as will any derivative evidence resulting 
from the identification or confession such as, for example, real evidence 
discovered as a result of the confession or, depending on the strength 
of the initial identification at the crime scene, any attempted courtroom 
identification of the accused. Here too, the underlying rationale for the 
Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule is that of deterrence. 132 Application 
128 Mellifonr, above n 1, 75-76 (footnotes omitted). 
129 United States v Wade, 388 US 218 at 224 (1967). There can be no 'critical stages' of 
a prosecution that has yet to take place. A criminal proceeding commences, and the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, at the point where there is an initiation of 
'adversary judicial proceedings'; Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682, 688 (1972). The initia-
tion of such proceedings' ordinarily requires a formal commitment of the government 
to prosecute, as evidenced by the riling of charges': LaFave et al, above n 61, vol 3, 
622-23. However, the mere fact that a person has been detained by government of-
ficials with the intention of ftling charges against him or her does not mean that he or 
she has become an accused, thereby triggering the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: 
United States v Gouveia, 467 US 180, 189-190(984). 
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of the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule to derivative evidence is 
entirely consonant with the deterrence objective, and for the same reason 
discussed above in relation to the FourthAmendment exclusionary rule. 
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination mandates, among 
other things, that involuntarily obtained primary confessional evidence 
is inadmissible in criminal trials. To this extent, the Fifth Amendment 
incorporates an exclusionary rule, although the rule does not apply 
to primary real evidence. 133 In this context, primary confessional 
evidence is obtained involuntarily if, taking into account the totality 
of circumstances,134 it was procured by overbearing the will of the 
accused. 135 In making this determination, the couns may not consider 
the accuracy of the confessional evidence136 and, therefore, the existence 
of independent evidence corroborating an involuntarily obtained 
primary confession will not render it admissible. 137 To date, the United 
States Supreme Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue of 
whether the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine is part and parcel of 
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, thereby requiring the exclusion of 
derivative evidence, real or otherwise. According to some distinguished 
academic commentators, however, it is generally assumed that the Fifth 
Amendment exclusionary rule incorporates the poisonous fruit doctrine 
so as to exclude both primary as well as derivative evidence of any genre, 
confessional or real. 138 
The underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule overlap 
with those underlying the Australian common law rules that exclude 
involuntarily obtained confessional evidence: concerns over reliability, the 
fact that using such evidence offends acceptable standards of conduct in 
133 Anderson v Maryland, 427 US 463, 473-474 (1976); Fisher v United States, 425 us 
391, 408 (1991); Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433,451-52 (1974). The Fifth Amend· 
ment Self-Incrimination Clause protects against compelled disclosures which are con-
sidered testimonial or communicative in nature such as, for example, confeSSional 
evidence and incriminating documents; it does not apply to real evidence which was 
actually involved in the crime(s) at issue such as a murder weapon, blood samples, 
fingerprints, fmgernail scrapings, hair samples and DNA samples derived from any of 
the foregoing or other sources: A Amar and R Lettow, 'Fifth amendment First PrinCi-
ples: The Self-InCrimination Clause' (1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 857 at 900. 
134 Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602 (1961). 
135 SPar! v United States, 156 us 51, 55 (1895); Haynes v Washington, 373 US 503, 
513-14 (1963). 
136 Colorado v Connelly, 479 us 157, 167 (1986) (Rehnquist eJ); Lego v Twomey, 404 
US 477,489 (1972); Doby v SC Department oj Corrections, 741 F 2d 7h. 7~ (1QM" 
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a civilized society,139 and, of course, deterrence of police misconduct.Ho 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the generally accepted view of 
the scope of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is the same as that 
urged with respect to the Australian common law rules at the outset of 
this paper. 
B The Exceptions to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rules 
1 The 'good faith' exception 
There are four recognised exceptions under which evidence will 
be admissible notwithstanding that it was obtained in violation of 
the aforementioned Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. These 
exceptions emanated from a general hostility towards the exclusionary 
rule that became manifest in the presidential election of 1968. 141 In 
the 1971 case of Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents,142 Burger C] 
suggested that 'there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that 
the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials t143 
and, consequently, the exclusionary rule should be rejected and replaced 
by statutes permitting victims of Fourth amendment violations to 
appear before spedal tribunals and seek monetary damages. 144 Although 
this suggestion failed to gain traction for a number of reasons,145 in 
Stone v Powell146 White J opined that the exclusionary rule 'should be 
substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those many 
circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer 
acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported with existing 
law and having reasonable grounds for this belief' .147 According to White 
139 Miller v Fenton, 474 us 104, 109 (1985), 
140 SPano v New York, 360 US 315,320 (1959): involuntary confessions should be ex-
cluded as the police should 'obey the law while enforcing the law', and this is true 
even if the confession so obtained is corroborated by independent evidence. 
141 Mellifont, above n 1, 77-8. Each of the four exceptions represents a balancing of the 
degree of the perceived beneficial deterrent effect of excJuding the evidence versus 
the cost of excluding probative and incriminating evidence from the fact-fmder's con-
sideration. 
142 Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 US 388 (1999). 
143 Ibid 416 (Burger C], dissenting). Burger C]'s assertion is belied by the fact that there 
has been a dramatic increase in the use of search warrants since the advent of the 
exclusionary rule. Prior to that, search warrants were rarely sought. 
144 Ibid 422-423. 
145 LaFave et ai, above n 61, vol 2, 11. 
146 Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976) (White J, dissenting). Prior to the development of 
......... fn .... N'r()pnise:fl exceotions to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment exclusion-
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J, in circumstances such as these the exclusion of the tainted evidence 
'can have no deterrent effect'. 148 The notion that exclusion of evidence 
does not further the objective of deterrence when the police are acting 
in the genuine belief that their conduct is both lawful and proper has 
been adopted throughout this article, especially in the context of the 
balancing tests that must be undertaken under the conunon law Bunning 
discretion and its statutory analogue, ss 138 and 139 of the UEL. On its 
face, therefore, White ]'s suggested 'good faith' exception appears to be 
sound in both logic and principle. 
That said, the 'good faith' exception espoused by White J has been 
subjected to severe criticism, and rightly so. One such criticism is that 
due to the difficulty in ascertaining what constitutes a reasonable 
mistake of law, it 'would put a premium on the ignorance of the police 
officer and ... the department which trains him' .149 In addition, such an 
exception would repose an unrealistic degree of faith in the integrity 
of the pre-trial fact-finding process.As suggested earlier, the unfortunate 
reality is that magistrates and judges do not generally accord equal 
weight to the testimony of law enforcement officials and civilians; rather, 
considerations of political correctness tip the scale heavily in favour of 
belieVing, or at least pretending to believe, what is often the perjured 
testimony of the former. ISO These criticisms notwithstanding, in United 
States v Leon 151 the United States Supreme Court partially adopted the 
'good faith' exception. 
In United States v Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did 
not prevent the use, during the prosecution's case-in-chief, of evidence 
obtained by police acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that 
was unsupported by probable cause. In writing for the majority,152White 
J opined that the exclusionary rule was not an actual part of the Fourth 
Amendment, but a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. 153 White J further 
opined that the rule's applicability in any given circumstance must be 
determined by weighing the costs and benefits of excluding evidence 
obtained in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. 154 Noting that the 
rule was designed to deter the police rather than punish the magistrates 
or judges who issue search warrants, White J opined that 'there exists no 
148 Ibid 540. 
149 Kaplan, 'The Limits of the ExclUSionary Rule', (1974) 26 Stanford Law Review 1027, 
1044-45. 
,150 Ibid. 
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evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or 
subvert the Fourth Amendment' 155 and, therefore, there is no justification 
'for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will 
have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate' . 156 
Finally,White J stressed that in with-warrant cases, there is 'ordinarily' no 
basis for excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct; that 
is, such police misconduct is usually lacking because the police were 
relying on the determination by the judge or magistrate that the warrant 
was supported by probable cause.157 Thus, 'the marginal or nonexistent 
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot 
justify the substantial costs. of exclusion' .158 
United States v Leon, however, did not hold that the exclusionary rule 
is always inapplicable as long as an officer has obtained a warrant and 
155 Ibid 916. 
156 Ibid 916-917. 
157 Ibid 920-921. It is important to emphasise the limitations of the Leon decision. Leon 
did not hold that the exclUSionary rule is inapplicable whenever a search warrant has 
been issued; rather, the Leon decision applies only to search warrants that are pre-
sumptively invalid due to either want of probable cause to support issuance or lack 
of sufficient particularity as to the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. It also appears that the Leon exception does not apply in instances where 
unconstitutional warrantless searches by the police engender information that is used 
to obtain a search warrant that is later challenged as the fruit of the prior warrantless 
search: United States v Scales, 903 F 2d 765, 768 (10th Cir, 1990) (Seymour J); United 
States v Vasey, 834 F 2d 782 (9th Cir, 1987). 
158 United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 922. In Brennan]'s dissenting opinion, he questioned 
the majority's assertion that the exclusionary rule was merely a judicially-created reme-
dy for Fourth Amendment transgressions that could be eviscerated 'through guesswork 
about deterrence' rather than 'a right grounded in that Amendment to prevent the gov-
ernment from subsequently making use of any evidence so obtained': at 943. Brennan 
J also took exception to the notion that in these circumstances, the costs of exc1usion 
outweighed any potential deterrent effect; he noted that the available statistics indicate 
'that._.prosecutors ... rarely drop cases because of potential search and seiZure problems: 
at 950_ He further opined that if there is a cost involved, 'it is not the exclusionary rule, 
but the Amendment itself that has imposed this cost' by expressing a preference for in-
dividual freedom and privacy over the achievement of more efficient law enforcement: 
at 941. Finally, Brennan J disagreed that there were little or no deterrent benefits to be 
derived from the exclusionary rule in cases of this genre: at 929--930. To the contrary, 
Brennan J opined that the objective of deterrence is served by exclusion irrespective 
of whether the police knew they were acting illegally; specifically, his Honour opined 
that magistrates and judges will know that little care is required in reviewing warrant 
applications because their mistakes will have miniscule consequences and the police 
will know that if a warrant has been issued, it will be considered as reasonable for them 
." _ .• -- ~~ : ...... 0':;";: T .... tippi! e,.dusion would provide a powerful incentive 
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abided by its terms;159 in particular~ the Court held that despite the fact 
that the constitutional challenge is to the magistrate's issuance of the 
warrant, exclusion of the tainted evidence is still required if the police 
lacked reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was valid. 160 
White ]'S majority opinion, however, noted four instances in which, as a 
matter of law, a police officer lacks reasonable grounds for such a belief, 
thereby triggering the full effect of the exclusionary rule. 161 The fIrst 
encompasses situations in which a facially valid warrant is invalidated 
on the basis that false statements were knowingly or recklessly made in 
the underlying affidavit. 162 The second includes instances in which the 
officer knows that the issuing magistrate or judge has 'wholly abandoned 
his judicial role' by becoming nothing more than a rubber stamp for the 
police; 163 that is to say that he or she has allowed himself or herself 
to become a leader of sorts of the search party'. 164 The third instance 
envisages situations in which 'a warrant may be so facially deficient-ie, 
in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be 
seized-that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 
valid' .165 Finally, the Leon exception is inapplicable when the affidavit 
was 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence entirely unreasonable' . [66 
What is common to these four situations is that the Court has determined 
that the police could not have acted with reasonable grounds for 
believing that the warrant was constitutionally valid. Indeed, each of the 
exceptions appears to involve Fourth Amendment encroachments of 
such magnitude and flagrancy that one would be hard pressed to find 
that the police acted with anything other than deliberate or reckless 
disregard of the Fourth Amendment. On its face, therefore, the Leon 
'good faith' exception appears to be consonant with the view that the 
interest of deterrence is never served by imposing sanctions on those 
who act in the genuine belief that their conduct is both legal and proper. 
159 laFave et ai, above n 61, val 2, 17. 
160 United States v Leon, 468 us 897,922·923 (White).). 
161 Ibid 922-924. 
162 Ibid 923; see Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 (1978) (BlackmunJ). 
163 United States v Leon, 468 US 897,923. 
i64 Lcrji Sales, Inc. V New York, 442 US 319,327 (1979) (Burger CD. 
165 Ibid 923; see also United States v Kow, 58 F 3d 423 (9th Cir, 1995). 
166 LcrJi Sales, Inc. V New York, 442 US 319, 327 (1979) (Burger CJ). One year prior to 
the Leon decision, the Court held in Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 (983), that appellate 
courts should apply a relaxed standard in assessing whether a warrant was supported 
by probable cause: at 238, see also at 23()'232 (Rehnquist J). SpecifiCally, it was held 
in Gates that it is sufficient if an appellate court finds that an issuing maeistrate had 
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Thus, the effect of Leon is to declare, by judicial fiat, the circumstances 
under which the police will be regarded as lacking a reasonable belief 
in the constitutionality of the search warrant in question or, in other 
words, taking refuge under a warrant which they know or suspect is 
constitutionally invalid. To the extent that Leon permits full application 
of the exclusionary rule in these four circumstances, it appears to be 
consistent with the deterrence-benefit purpose of the exclusionary 
rule. Yet given the reality of the pressure reposed on magistrates and 
judges to conform their fact-findings to what the public perceives as 
pOlitically correct, can the judiciary be trusted to make honest, albeit 
pOlitically incorrect factual determinations as to whether: a warrant was 
predicated upon knowingly or recklessly made falsehoods contained in 
an affidavit; a magistrate or judge has wholly abandoned his or her role 
as a neutral and detached arbiter; a warrant is so obviously defiCient on 
its face that an executing officer cannot reasonably believe it to be valid; 
or a supporting affidavit is so obviously lacking in indicia of probable 
cause that no executing officer could reasonably believe it existed? This 
writer's view on this question was emphatically expressed earlier in this 
piece. Given that view, the Leon exception must be seen as an important 
step in the emasculation and eventual demise of the exclusionary rule. 
In Illinois v Krull, for example, the Court extended the Leon 'good 
faith' exception to include instances in which law enforcement officers 
act in what is considered as objectively reasonable reliance on a 
statute authorising a search, but the statute is ultimately invalidated as 
contravening the Fourth Amendment. 167 As in Leon1 the Court reasoned 
that exclusion would have little or no deterrent effect on the police and 
that legislators, like magistrates and judges, are not the people whom 
the exclusionary rule was designed to deter. 168 Moreover, the Court 
opined that exclusion of eVidence in these circumstances would have 
little or no deterrent effect on further attempts by legislators to confer 
unconstitutional search authority. 169 
Even more forebodirtg for the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule is 
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Hudson v Michigan. 170 
In Hudson v Michigan, the Court explicitly rejected the precept that the 
exclUSionary rule was essential in so far as deterring FOlliLh Amendment 
violations. I7l Instead, the majority opined that due to the expansion of the: 
167 Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 349-350 (1987) (Blackmun J, with whom Rehnquist q,! 
White, Powell and Scalia]] concurred). 
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42 USC § 1983 tort remedy for constitutional violations,l72 together with 
the enhanced congressional authorization of attorney's fees for plaintiffs 
in civil rights actions, it could be assumed that civil liability was sufficient 
to deter FounhAmendment violations. 173 
2 The (attenuated connection' exception 
This exception, though purporting to rest on the usual balancing of the 
degree to which exclusion will deter future police illegality against the 
costs of depriving the fact-finder of incriminating evidence, is perhaps 
the most ominous of all the exceptions that have served to erode 
the exclusionary rule. In theory at least, all four of the exceptions are 
predicated on the foregoing balancing test. In United States v Deluca, 174 
for example, the Court opined that the attenuated connection doctrine 
attempts to delineate the point at which the pernicious consequences 
of illegal police action become so diminished that the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule is outweighed by the cost of depriving the 
fact-finder of probative evidence of guilt.175 Stated differently, this 
exception is based on an appellate court's judgment as to whether the 
admission of unconstitutionally tainted evidence will Significantly dilute 
the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule. 176 The reality, however, 
is that this determination will often depend more on the courts'views 
on such subsidiary issues as whether the police are likely to view the 
invocation of this exception as providing a powetful inducement to flout 
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment; 177 another important subsidiary 
issue is whether judges have the ability and inclination to extirpate 
instances in which the actions of the police are motivated by a desire to 
exploit the ever expanding limitations on tbe'fruit of the poisonous tree' 
doctrine. 178 Another sad reality to be gleaned by the case law concerning 
this exception is that the paramount consideration in applying the 
exception is often the judge's desire to further weaken the exclusionary 
172 42 USC § 1983 provides that' [eJvery person who, under color of any statute, ordi· 
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citiZen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eqUity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress' . 
'173 Hudson vMichigan, 126S Ct 2159,2167·2168. Bur see LaFaveet aI, above n61, vol 2, 
at p 10. lafave, citing various authorities, chronicles many glaring deficienCies in the 
notion that civil liability would be an effective deterrent against Fourth Amendment 
and other constitutional violations. 
174 United States v Deluca, 269 F 3d 1128 (lOth Cir, 2001). 
17S Ihid 1 Hl-1 H? 
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rule.179 It is important to emphasise that in the vast majority of cases, 
this exception is applied to derivative rather than primary fruits of the 
'poisonous tree'. 180 
In Hudson v Michigan,181 the Court held that the police had violated 
the knock-and-announce rule which is admittedly part and parcel of 
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 182 It nonetheless invoked the attenuated connection doctrine 
on the basis that attenuation can occur not only in instances where there 
is a remote causal nexus between the Fourth Amendment transgression 
and the evidence it uncovers, but also when exclusion would not 
serve the purpose or interl!st protected by the violated constitutional 
guarantee. 183 Having conduded that the interests sought to be 
protected by the knock-and-announce rule did not include the right to 
prevent the police from seizing the evidence described in the warrant, 
the 5 to 4 majority had little difficulty in holding the exclusionary rule 
inapplicable in the circumstances of the case. 184 The majority was also 
careful to pay lip service to the balanCing test underlying each of the four 
exceptions noted above; that is, it opined that the exclusionary rule was 
also inapplicable because it applies only 'where its deterrence benefits 
outweigh its "substantial costs"', which the Court concluded it did not in 
this instance. 185 
The points raised by the four dissenting justices exposed not only the 
seriously flawed reasoning of the majority, but more importantly the 
majority's flagrant inclination to finally emasculate the FourthAmendment 
exclusionary rule into oblivion.The dissent made three extremely telling 
points: the majority'S reasoning failed to take into account that: 
(1) the knock-and-announce rule protects the privacy interests of occupants 
by ensuring that the police will not enter in violation of its requirements. 
Thus, even if the majority's reasoning had merit, it would not entail the 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule had no application on these facts;ls6 
179 Ibid 422; see also Segura v United States, 468 US 796 (1984). 
180 Lafave et aI, above n 61, vo13, 422, 423. 
181 Hudson v Michigan, 126 S Ct 2159 (2006). 
182 Ibid 2162-2163. 
183 Ibid 2164. 
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(2) whether the interests underlying the knock-and-announce rule are 
implicated in any given circumstance is not germane, as exemplified in 
the fact that contraband seized in an unconstitutional search is subject to 
exclusion despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment is not concerned 
with its protection;187 and 
(3) the majority's interest-based approach represents a major departure 
from legal precedent in that the majority failed to cite a single case in 
which 'suppression turned on such a "detailed relation" between the 
constitutional violation and the evidence found '.188 
The vvriter's view is that the dissenting justices are correct on all three pOints. 
Stated differently, the dissenters correctly pointed out that the majority has 
effectively circumvented the exclusionary rule by parsing the many rules 
which comprise the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Then, 
when it conveniently appears that a cogent argument can be made that 
exclusion would not serve the interests sought to be protected by the 
particular rule breached, the majority has given itself permission to conclude 
that the exclusionary rule is simply inapplicable. As the dissenters indicated, 
under all prior precedents the only relevant inquiry in Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the admissibility of evidence is whether the amendment was 
violated and, if so, whether the facts of the case are such that any evidence 
obtained as a result should be subject to the exclusionary rule because its 
deterrence benefits outweigh its significant costs. 
3 The <independent source' exception 
Under this exception, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable if the 
government learned of the evidence from a lawful source that was in 
no way linked to the constitutional violation; 189 in other words, if a 
but-for causal nexus is lacking between the unconstitutional action 
and the discovery of the tainted eVidence because the government 
discovered the evidence through lawful means that were not linked to 
the unconstitutional action, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. As the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegality by excluding its fruits 
and thereby removing any incentive to violate the law, this exception 
appears to be eminently justifiable. Moreover, to exclude evidence in 
cases when it was discovered through such a lawful and independent 
Source would have the untoward effect of placing the police in a worse 
position than they would have been in the absence of any illegality. 190 
More recently, however, the notion of what is considered an independent 
source has expanded so as not to reqUire that there must be a separate 
:~d completely independent line of investigation leading to the discovery 
(2011) 13 UNDALR 
of the same evidence. 191 Rather, at present the term 'independent source' 
denotes that the exclusionary rule has no application in instances where 
there was no reliance on illegally obtained information to obtain a 
warrant or ground a search. 192 This is true regardless of whether there 
actually was or would have been an independent and lawful process a 
foot leading to the unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 193 
When an independ~nt source exists which is known to the police prior 
to the illegality in question, this exception is very straightforward and 
militates strongly in favour of admission. When the illegality precedes the 
independent source, this exception is laden with the potential for abuses 
that threaten the very core of the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary 
rule.As adroitly stated by one distinguished group of commentators: 
[O]nce illegally obtained evidence incriminating the defendant has been found 
it can always be asserted with some plausibility that any information acquired 
thereafter is attributable to the authorities being spurred on and their investigation 
focused by the earlier discovery. At this point, the question is whether the 
'independent source' test sometimes can be met even though it may well be that 
'but-for' the earlier violation the investigation which uncovered the",evidence 
would never have been commenced.194 
This point is well-illustrated by the case of United States v Bacall. 195 In 
Bacall, US customs officials illegally seized certain inventory as a result 
of an illegal search of the defendant. 196 Thereafter, the customs officials 
contacted the French authorities and requested that they investigate 
another matter relating to the defendant.197 The French authorities 
then undertook an investigation which led to the seizure of letters 
and cheques implicating the defendant in various crimes. 198 In holding 
these documents to be admissible,199 the Court further opined, however, 
that the more relevant question was 'whether anything seized or any 
leads gained from the seizure tended significantly to direct the foreign 
investigations' towards the documents later seized;20o that is, whether the 
Customs officials had, subsequent to the illegal seizure, a substantially 
greater incentive to seek the letters and cheques than they had prior 
191 Segura v United States, 468 US 796 at 814 (1984); see also Murray v United States, 
487 US 533,537,541 (1988) (Scalia]. with whom Rehnquist C)., White and Blackmun 
J). concurred). 
192 Ibid. 
193 Dressler, above n 138,415. 
194 laFave et aI, above n 61, vol 3, 426. 
195 United States u Bacall, 443 F 2d 1050 (9th Cir, 1971). 
REJECTION OF THE FRUIT OFTHE POISONOUS TREE DOCfRlNE IN AUSTRALIA 
to the illegal seizure.201 The Court concluded that they did not and, 
consequently, declined to apply the exclusionary ru1e.202 
On one view, the Court's reasoning was sound in that the earlier 
unconstitutional seizure merely led the police to focus their investigation on 
the accused without effectively immunizing him from further prosecution 
simply because the later investigation uncovering the letters and cheques 
would not have occurred but-for the earlier illegal seizure.203 The writer's 
view, however, is that this view is untenable in that it ignores the fact that if 
the police are aware that their initial illegal conduct may lead to subsequent 
investigations that result in convictions for other crimes, there is every 
incentive to commit constitutional violations because the net result may 
be to place them in a better position for having violated the constitution 
than by complying with it. 204 This is antithetical to the deterrence benefit 
that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve and, therefore, further 
emasculates the protections once accorded by the Fourth Amendment. 
4 The <inevitable discovery' exception 
The 'inevitable discovery' exception205 is really a permutation of the 
'independent source' doctrine in that it too requires the prosecution 
to demonstrate that ultimately, the tainted evidence would have been 
discovered by lawful means.206 The former exception, however, differs 
from the latter in that the latter is concerned with whether the police 
actually obtained the disputed evidence by reliance upon a lawful and 
independent source. 207 The former, on the other hand, is concerned with 
whether the illegally obtained evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered through independent and lawful means.208 In this context, 
lawful means arc those that are wholly independent of any illegally tainted 
primary or derivative evidence.209 As with the 'independent source' 
exception, this exception appears to be eminently justifiable in that it 
renders inadmissible any evidence obtained by way of exploitation of 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 laFave et al, above n 61, vo13, 426. 
204 Comment, (1977) 31 University of Miami Law Review, 615, 625. As we have noted, 
sanctions other than exclUSion such as civil liability remedies have proven to be woe-
fully ineffective at deterring police illegality: laFave et aI, above n 61, vol 2, 10. 
205 Nix v Williams, 467 US 431(1984). 
206 Ibid 444 (Burger CJ). 
207 Wave et al, above n 61,428. 
208 Ibid. This exception does not apply to illegally obtained primary confessional evi-
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police illegality, yet precludes the accused from receiving what amounts 
to an undeserved grant of immunity because of police misconduct that 
is separate and independent from the lawful means through which the 
evidence would have been inevitably discovered.2Io As the United States 
Supreme Court opined in Nix v Williams, 211 the 'inevitable discovery' and 
'independent source' doctrines have in common that both are designed 
to ensure that the prosecution is neither 'put in a better position than it 
would have been in if no illegality had transpired', nor 'put in a worse 
position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct'. 212 
This exception has come under attack on the grounds that it is 'based on 
conjecture'Z13 and places so much emphasis on fact-fmding that courts 
can ignore bad faith pOlice misconduct with Virtual impunity.214 In 
addition, the exception is open to grave abuses by police who are inclined 
to manufacture evidence of 'inevitable discovery'.215 It is important to 
emphasise that unlike the 'independent source' exception, the 'inevitable 
discovery' exception cannot be based on a mere assumption that inevitable 
discovery would have occurred through some lawful procedure that was 
in no way predicated on the fruits of a poisonous tree; stated differently, 
the exception is because the police had, but did not avail themselves of, 
lawful means at their disposal that would have rendered the actions which 
uncovered the evidence lawful. 216 To successfully invoke the exception, 
therefore, the government must not only satisfy the courts that a lawful 
and independent investigation was inevitable, but just as importantly, that 
the investigation would have inevitably led to the discovery of the tainted 
evidence.217 In this context, the word 'inevitably' denotes evidence that 
210 Maguire, 'How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary 
Rule' (l964) 55 Journal oj Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 307, 317. 
211 NixvWilliams, 467 US 431 (1984). 
212 Ibid at 443-444. This exception not only applies to both primary as well as derivative 
eVidence, but applies in instances in which the inevitable discovery would have come 
through the efforts of a civilian who would have turned the evidence over to police: 
see United States v Kennedy, 61 F 3d 494 (6th Cir, 1995). 
213 Harold S Novikoff, 'Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary 
Rules, The Notes' (1974) 74 Columbia Law Review 88, 89. Yet what is the standard 
by which it is determined that the tainted evidence would have been discovered. 
This ambiguity can be justifiably viewed as an open invitation to the courts to further 
weaken the exclusionary rule. The matter of police perjury in corrupting the fact-
finding process and, in turn, the exclusionary rule, has been discussed earlier in this 
piece. 
214 Mellifont, above n 1,100. The susceptibility of judges to the pressure to conform their 
•.. -'- -. ~~-", .... ..r ...mth nolitical correctness has also been dealt with 
REJECTION OFTHE FRUIT OF TIlE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE IN .AUSTRALIA 
actually would have been discovered as opposed to evidence that might 
have or could have been discovered. 218 
VI CONCLUSION 
This article has canvassed a number of exclusionary rules and discretions 
in Australia, all of which have thus far refused to apply the American 'fruit 
of the poisonous tree' doctrine to exclude derivative evidence that would 
not have been discovered but-for primary evidence excluded under one 
or more of these rules or discretions. In so doing, the point has been 
emphasised that the American exclusionary rule, which incorporates 
I fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, was created for the specific purpose 
of serving as an effective deterrent against misconduct on the part of law 
enforcement officials. Further, it has been strenuously argued that the 
interest of deterrence is not generally served by imposing sanctions (such 
as the exclusion of evidence) on those who have acted in a mistaken, 
albeit genuine belief, that their conduct was lawful and proper. That 
aside, with the technical exception of s 85 of the DEL, all of the rrues and 
discretions to which the poisonous fruit doctrine should arguably apply 
require illegal, improper or unfair conduct on the part of law enforcement 
officials which, in the overwhelming majority of cases, consists of the 
type of deliberate or reckless misconduct that the American exclusionary 
rule and its concomitant poisonous fruit doctrine were designed to deter. 
This raises two important questions: should Australia adopt what most 
agree is the only effective deterrent against official lawlessness; and if 
Australia were to adopt the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine or some 
permutation of it, how should the doctrine be applied, keeping in mind 
the extent to which the American courts have severely emasculated their 
own exclusionary rule? 
If one accepts the notion that the paramount underpinning of each of 
the exclusionary rules and discretions examined in this paper is to deter 
those who are entrusted with enforcing the law from doing so by illegal 
or improper means, then the answer to the first question must be in the 
affirmative. The lesson of history is that the threat of civil liability has never 
proven to be an effective deterrent in this regard, and for the various reasons 
noted in this paper. Thus, the exclusionary rule was recognised as an integral 
part of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and later 
extended to the Fifth Amendment right against self~incrimination as well 
as the Sixth Amendment right to the Assistance of Counsel. Recognising 
that the exclUSion of only primary evidence obtained in violation of these 
constitutional rights would Wldermine the rule's deterrent effect through 
DoUce awareness that the excluded evidenc.e: mav lead to the: discovt":rv of 
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admissible derivative evidence, the American courts wisely broadened the 
rule to apply to both primary as well as derivative evidence; that is to say 
that if any of the aforementioned constitutional rights are violated, then 
all evidence that would not have been uncovered but-for the violation is 
inadmissible per se. Had the doctrine been confined to the exclusion of 
only primary evidence, the result in many cases would be that the police 
would profit from their wrongdoing by placing themselves in a better 
position for having violated the constitution than by complying with it. 
Creating such an incentive for law enforcement officials to engage in 
unlawful conduct as a means of achieving more efficient law enforcement 
represents, in the opinion of this writer, a giant step toward the slippery 
slope leading to fascism. 
Consonant with the views expressed throughout this paper, Australia 
would be well served by adopting the type of prophylactic exclusionary 
rule that existed in America prior to its evisceration over the past few 
decades, particularly through the creation of exceptions which, on their 
face, appear to be justified on the basis that they encompass situations 
in which exclusion would provide little or no deterrence that would 
justify the costs of depriving the fact-finder of probative evidence 
of gUilt. Under this approach; any derivative evidence that would not 
have been discovered but-for the inadmissible primary evidence would 
be inadmissible per se, assuming the court finds that the police acted 
in wilful or reckless breach of the law or policy at issue. In addition, 
the proposed rule should include the four exceptions to the American 
exclusionary rule on the basis that if applied with courage and integrity, 
they do not undennine the deterrence benefit sought to be achieved by 
the various exclusionary rules and discretions examined in this paper. 
Regrettably, however, the degree to which any criminal justice system, 
form of government or exclusionary rule or discretion will be effective in 
achieving its objective necessarily depends on the courage and integrity 
of those who comprise or administer it. The correct application of any 
proposed exclusionary rule or discretion, therefore, will always depend 
on the extent to which the relevant magistrate or judge can summon the 
courage and integrity to resist the temptation to succumb to the public 
outrage that is practically certain to ensue when evidence of guilt is 
excluded, particularly when heinous offences are involved.219 Moreover, 
there are many instances in which magistrates and judges, irrespective of 
any fear of public anger, will turn a blind eye to patently perjured police 
evidence for reasons of their own personal biases. As the experiences 
of this writer, colleagues, present and former Jaw enforcement officials, 
• ,",-~C",,,.,nt" A.hn Dershowitz indicate1 illegal or improper conduct 
is too easily transformed into putative exemplary conduct through 
perjured testimony which magistrates and judges are loath to callout. 
Thus, a legislative or incremental common law approach to solving this 
problem is simply unworkable. Given that disconcerting observation, the 
question becomes one of how best to minimise these flaws in the type 
of exclusionary rule advanced in the present discussion? 
In searching for at least a partial remedy to any ostensibly intractable 
problem, it is often helpful to initially rule out what will not achieve 
the desired objective. Attempting to ferret out the courageous and 
honest magistrate,s and, judges from the craven and disingenuous 
ones is impracticable. Many, including this writer, are of the view that 
the psychiatriC discipline is still in its inchoate stages of development 
and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to consistently and accurately 
segregate the intrepid and honest from the cowardly and dishonest. 
Although educating the public to better understand and appreciate the 
true underpinnings of these exclusionary rules and discretions would 
certainly attenuate the incidence of result-driven decisions, it is far easier 
said than done. Despite compulsory primary and secondary education 
in Australia and elsewhere, ignorance among the electorate concerning 
important issues is so endemic that it would not be surprising if the 
courts were to take judicial notice of it. Is there reason to believe that 
the electorate would be any less ignorant when it comes to familiarising 
themselves with such esoteric legal issues as the purpose and scope 
of exclUSionary rules and discretions, much less the poisonous fruit 
doctrine? 
Although far from a perfect means of redressing the human frailty that 
wreaks havoc on the integrity of the fact-fmding process upon which 
the proper application of our exclusionary rules and discretions depend, 
the writer believes that there is a means of Significantly reducing the 
effect of perjured police evidence, thereby enhancing the integrity of 
the fact-rmding process and reducing the public anger that has thus far 
resulted in a pervasive unwillingness amongst judges to provide more 
than lip service to these salutary rules and discretions. In all cases in 
which evidence is sought to be excluded under one or more, of the 
exclusionary rules and discretions, and where the court's decision will 
turn on a fact-finding that involves a conflict in the version of events 
given by the police and the accused, the police should be required to 
undergo at least two polygraph examinations by well-qualified experts. 
Because the accused enjoys what is at least a theoretical presumption 
of innocence, coupled with the vast financial resources available to the 
'gOvernment, it should be the police rather than the accused that bear the 
:onus and costs of undenzoimz the oolvgraph examinations. 
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While it is true that polygraphs are neither admissible nor 100 per cent 
accurate, it is also a fact that many prosecutors, potential employers and 
others routinely use them in making prosecutorial, hiring and other 
important decisions. Thus, legislation should be enacted to render the 
test results admissible in the scenario postulated. Further, the legislation 
should mandate that although the results are admissible in this context, 
they are to be considered as persuasive, but not dispositive of the 
credibility issue at hand. Further, the validity of the results should bl:: 
subject to full cross-examination, and the weight to be accorded the 
results should be determined in the same manner as evidence given by 
any witness. Just as a witness' evidence is admissible despite obvious 
reasons to question its reliability such as bias, prior convictions, previous 
inconsistent statements and other factors, so too should the potentially 
flawed results of polygraph examinations, at least for the limited purpose 
advanced here. There is no reason to believe that a fact-finder, especially 
a magistrate or judge armed with the knowledge that such test results are 
generally inadmissible, cannot be trusted to evaluate and accord proper 
weight to the expert testimony of the examiners. It is the writer's belief 
that although far from a solution to what may be an intractable flaw in 
our adversarial system of justice, polygraph testing under the suggested 
conditions would provide politically sensitive and well-intentioned 
judges with sufficient political cover to at least ameliorate the deplorable 
state of affairs that has been and continues to be a cancer on the integrity 
of the administration of justice in Australia and other countries. 
